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This is a study on the Flint water crisis and lead poisoning and its effects for the city residents. It focuses on the relationship 
between the locals and the state and explores how that relationship was formed and transformed during the crisis. It examines the 
historical and economic background of the water crisis, suggesting that the situation should be seen as a man-made disaster 
caused by the state of Michigan. The main research questions revolve around the twofold process of the state – citizen interaction 
and the state’s role in the crisis: How do the residents of Flint perceive the state during the water crisis? How did the city’s history 
of economic difficulties affect in the background of the water crisis’ emergence? 
 
This study contributes to the growing anthropological discussion about the role of the state and its governance, proposing a tragic 
example of what can happen when financial stability is placed above everything else, democratic decision-making disregarded and 
when the adopted neoliberal governance forms exacerbate local injustice and marginalization. The study also contributes to the 
discussions of water management, disasters and environmental injustice. 
 
The study is based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Flint, Michigan between February and April of 2018. It is based on 
participant observation and semi-structured interviews with locals, supplemented by following the local media, reading historical 
accounts and attending events in the city. The interviews were conducted with a total of 15 core research participants (8 male, 7 
female) and they came from a variety of social and economic backgrounds. 
 
The thesis suggests that the residents perceive the state as an unjust force from the above, systematically disregarding the 
struggling city. They see the state as having a role of historically producing poverty, vulnerability and abandonment through 
economic mismanagement, deindustrialization and neoliberal policies. The residents blame the state for governing the city as if it 
was a business, thus focusing on cutting costs and placing economic interests above human safety. After the state adopted 
undemocratic policies such as emergency management and stripped the city of its voice, the residents lost their trust in the 
integrity of the officials and the protection the state is supposed to offer its citizens. This thesis demonstrates how a focus on state 
processes and state-citizen interaction can provide useful insights for understanding both natural and human-made disasters and 
the unequal living conditions produced by them. 
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Tämä tutkielma tarkastelee Flintin vesikriisiä ja sen vaikutuksia kaupungin asukkaisiin. Tutkielma keskittyy kaupunkilaisten ja 
(osa)valtion väliseen suhteeseen ja tutkii, miten tämä suhde muodostui ja muuttui vesikriisin aikana. Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan 
vesikriisin taustalla vaikuttaneita historiallisia ja taloudellisia muutoksia ja osoitetaan, kuinka vesikriisi tulisi nähdä valtion ja sen 
päättäjien aikaansaamana katastrofina. Tutkimuskysymykset keskittyvät valtion ja kansalaisten väliseen vuorovaikutukseen ja 
valtion prosesseihin: Millaisena toimijana Flintin asukkaat näkevät valtion vesikriisin aikana? Miten kaupungin historian taloudelliset 
vaikeudet vaikuttivat kriisin syntyyn? 
 
Tutkielma osallistuu yhä kasvavaan antropologiseen tutkimukseen valtioista, niiden roolista ja hallinnoinnista. Tutkielma kuvaa 
konkreettisen esimerkin kautta mitä voi tapahtua, kun taloudellinen tasapaino nostetaan tärkeimmäksi asiaksi, demokraattinen 
päätöksenteko sivuutetaan ja miten uusliberalistiset hallinnointikäytännöt voivat pahentaa jo olemassa olevaa paikallista 
eriarvoisuutta ja marginalisaatiota. Lisäksi tutkielma osallistuu keskusteluihin vedenhallinnasta, katastrofeista ja 
ympäristöoikeudesta. 
 
 
Tutkimuksen perustana on etnografinen kenttätyö Flintissä, Michiganissa helmi-huhtikuussa 2018. Tutkimus perustuu tuona aikana 
tehdylle osallistuvalle havainnoinnille ja puolistrukturoiduille haastatteluille, joita täydennettiin mediaseurannan, kaupungin 
historiaan perehtymisen ja paikallisiin tapahtumiin osallistumisen avulla. Tutkimukseen osallistui yhteensä 15 ydinhaastateltavaa (8 
miestä, 7 naista), jotka kaikki tulivat erilaisista sosioekonomisista taustoista.  
 
Tutkielman analyysi osoittaa, että kaupungin asukkaat näkevät valtion ylhäältä päin toimivana, epäoikeudenmukaisena voimana, 
joka systemaattisesti jätti kaupunkilaiset huomiotta päätöksenteossa. Paikalliset kokevat, että valtiolla on historiallisesti ollut suuri 
rooli köyhyyden ja haavoittuvuuden luomisessa ja kaupungin taloudellisessa ja sosiaalisessa hylkäämisessä. Teollisuuden 
purkaminen (deindustrialization) alueelta ja valtion harjoittamat uusliberalistiset toimintamallit loivat Flintiin otolliset olosuhteet 
vesikriisin synnylle.  
 
Asukkaat syyttävät valtiota siitä, että se hallinnoi kaupunkia kuin yritystä, sillä se panosti ennen kaikkea taloudellisten 
kustannusten leikkaamiseen ja asetti säästötavoitteet kaupunkilaisten turvallisuuden ja hyvinvoinnin edelle. He kokevat, että valtio 
toimi epädemokraattisesti, kun se määräsi Flintille hätätilapäällikön (emergency manager) vastaamaan kaupungin taloudesta. 
Hätätilapäällikön määrääminen vei kaupunginhallitukselta ja paikallisilta mahdollisuudet vaikuttaa heitä koskeviin päätöksiin, minkä 
seurauksena kaupunkilaiset menettivät luottamuksensa valtioon ja sen kykyyn suojella kansalaisiaan. Tutkielma osoittaa, kuinka 
valtion ja kansalaisten välisen suhteen tutkiminen ja huomioiminen voi auttaa meitä ymmärtämään niin luonnollisia kuin ihmisten 
aiheuttamiakin katastrofeja ja niiden synnyttämää eriarvoisuutta.   
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1 Introduction 
 
“The day that anthropologists give up their attempt to ground meanings in politics and 
economics will be a sad day. The loss will be not so much for themselves as for the 
social sciences in general.”  
- Mary Douglas, Risk and Blame 
 
Imagine turning on the faucet in your kitchen to have a glass of water on a warm 
spring day. But you notice that instead of being transparent like water should be, 
the liquid in your glass is brown and it smells of sewage. You quickly pour the 
water back into the sink, frowning. In the evening, the same thing happens as 
you are about to fill the tub and enjoy a bath. Something is not right with the 
water, you have a gut feeling of it, but you do not yet know that you will be 
forced to stop using the water and your city will soon make national and 
international headlines because of its undrinkable water.  
 
According to the World Health Organization, a staggering 2.1 billion people in 
the world lack access to safe drinking water and it is estimated that by 2025, 
half of the world’s population will live in water-stressed areas (WHO 2019). The 
example above is not a historical event, a temporary catastrophe in a 
developing country several years ago, but an example of what people in Flint, 
Michigan, told me they were experiencing as recently as in the spring of 2014. 
In this thesis I look at the Flint water crisis and the city’s lead poisoning from an 
anthropological perspective, focusing on the relations between the state and the 
Flint residents. I also construct a bigger picture of the historical forces behind 
the catastrophe. I propose that the situation should be seen as more than just “a 
water crisis”, as an all-encompassing disaster caused by Michigan state officials 
who governed the economically struggling city by a neoliberal mindset, valuing 
finances above human health and safety.  
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The slow responses of local, state and federal officials, as well as their negation 
of the issue, further prolonged the crisis and the lead exposure of the city 
residents. The lead poisoning of the almost 100 000 people of Flint in turn 
contributed to the growing lack of trust for the state and its democratic practices. 
The water crisis happened (and is still happening) in a political and economic 
landscape dominated by neoliberalism — an ideology at the root of the crisis 
which values the operation of the free market. In a neoliberal operating 
environment, citizens are stripped of their voice and their distrust for the state is 
fueled by deceit and undemocratic practices. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the Flint residents’ mundane feelings 
towards and perceptions of the state and its practices. How did the water crisis 
affect their everyday life? Who do they blame for the issue? How do they see 
the state and its practices affecting them? How did their belief in democracy and 
trust toward the state officials crumble during the crisis? I propose that in the 
case of Flint, the locals see the state as producing vulnerable subjects through 
its processes of neoliberalism, austerity and economic and social abandonment. 
The mismanagement, indifference and downright violence practiced by the state 
has throughout decades led to Flint being a disinvested and poor city, a suitable 
candidate for the kind of man-made disaster that the water crisis is. My research 
data supports this argument, as all of my informants brought up the different 
levels of state-sanctioned abandonment, a view of Flint and its residents not 
being worthy enough to be protected from crises like this.  
 
 
1.1 Research questions and perspective of the study 
 
My research questions are: 
1. How do the residents of Flint perceive the state during the water crisis? 
2. How did the city’s history of economic difficulties affect in the background of 
the water crisis’ emergence? 
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Both my research questions will be answered throughout my thesis, the 
explanations even overlapping each other, as the topics of the state and 
economics are intrinsically linked together. For my first question I have 
formulated a few subsidiary questions that help me construct my answer: “What 
kind of interaction between the state and the residents was going on during the 
crisis?” and “How do the residents see themselves as defined and valued by the 
state?” I will provide an in-depth understanding of the relationship between the 
residents and the state, emphasizing its role not just during the immediate crisis, 
but throughout Flint’s history. My second question takes up that history part of 
the crisis and in answering that I explore the link between a neoliberal state and 
an economically struggling city.  
 
I provide answers to these questions based on the data gathered during my 
eight-week long fieldwork in Flint in the winter of 2018, which included 
discussions and interviews with my research participants, analyses of these 
discussions, participant observation in the city and some historical accounts of 
Flint’s evolution during the past centuries. 
 
I propose that the state, in my thesis theorized precisely as the state of 
Michigan, was according to my informants the main culprit for the water crisis. I 
argue that the locals construct a picture of the state through their everyday 
interactions with it and its officials. These interactions are things such as being 
lied to about the water quality, the officials refusing to switch back to the original 
water source and conducting biased water tests. Through these practices my 
informants construct a perception of the state as being a force acting from the 
above in undemocratic ways and disregarding their complaints and health 
issues in order to govern the city with a neoliberal mindset.  
 
However, as will become clear further in my thesis, the state cannot and should 
not be seen as a coherent actor with one agenda, but as a cluster of different 
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entities that are pulling it in separate directions and causing conflicts. In addition 
to the state’s cost-effective and neoliberal actions right before and during the 
crisis, it has for decades been contributing in the background to the slow 
collapse of the former industrial city.  
 
As my fieldwork data shows, the residents of Flint are deeply dissatisfied and 
disappointed with the state’s actions, calling especially the emergency 
management law undemocratic and unjust toward the city with a majority of 
people being poor and of color. Even though the residents started complaining 
early on about the water quality, the state officials kept arguing that the water 
was fine, and the situation would get better. Not listening to the people, denying 
all possible problems and acting too slowly are some of the things the officials 
were accused of and which caused the residents to lose trust in the officials and 
their integrity. All of this led to a questioning of the citizen — state relationship 
and transformed the ways the residents see themselves as produced by the 
state, something that I will further elaborate in chapter 4.1. 
 
My thesis contributes to the growing discussion about the role of the state and 
its governance, proposing a tragic example of what can happen when financial 
stability is placed above everything else, democratic decision-making 
disregarded and when the adopted neoliberal governance forms exacerbate 
local injustice and marginalization. My thesis traces the relationship between the 
state and its neoliberal managing models and how citizens perceive the state 
and its actions in their everyday lives. Usually, neoliberalism is associated with 
privatization and big companies working profit-focused and harming the 
communities around them. In the case of Flint, however, there was no private 
company behind the water crisis, but instead a state that placed monetary 
interests above human safety. In anthropology as well, in the context of 
environmental and social catastrophes, neoliberalism has mostly been used to 
explain a certain type of post-disaster reconstruction and “capitalizing” on 
people’s suffering after a crisis. My thesis, on the contrary, strives to explain two 
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less studied phenomena: state-sanctioned neoliberal policies and their impact in 
the formation of a crisis, as opposed to the aftermath.  
 
My research brings together the economic and historical aspects of the water 
crisis, tying them to an ethnographic focus on the personal and community 
experience of the situation, such as people’s vulnerability, resilience and 
agency. Anthropology as a discipline is well suited for studying the cultural 
foundations of state formation. Ethnographic fieldwork is a useful tool for looking 
at state structures from the grassroots, through the anthropological gaze 
(Bouchard 2011, p. 201). I want to emphasize, though, that I do not study the 
state as an institution, but rather its policies and the people’s perceptions of it. 
To paraphrase Bouchard about the significance of anthropological research on 
states: “...it is the on-the-ground research on lived lives in states that provides 
the richest detail to anthropologists studying states, and has significant potential 
to develop new theories that will allow the discipline to make its contribution to 
the study of state-level organization” (ibid., p. 203). 
 
Being such a recent case, not very much research in social sciences has been 
done about the Flint crisis. Thus, my thesis is a contribution to that and I hope it 
can inspire some future anthropologists/social scientists to familiarize 
themselves with the case. There is some notable anthropological literature 
about other cities around the world like Flint — economically abandoned and 
subjected to environmental harm. In the United States, anthropologists began 
looking at the consequences of deindustrialization in the 1980s1. The shutting 
down of factories and other industrial facilities lead to thousands of workers 
getting laid off and the American working class more or less collapsed, politically 
and economically (Ortner 2016, p. 53). In addition to the themes of the state and 
neoliberalism, there are many other important topics tied to my analysis of the 
                                                          
1  For instance, Christine J. Walley (2009) has written an impressive depiction of 
the deindustrialization of the Southwest Chicago in the 1980s. Her autoethnographic piece from 
a daughter’s perspective is about her father who suffers deeply after one of the many steel mills 
in the area is closed down. 
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Flint case, of which also water management, human rights and urban 
catastrophes should be mentioned.  
 
The story of the Flint water crisis is a difficult one to tell (especially in such a 
short piece of research paper) because of all the complexities surrounding it, the 
emotional aspects and the fact that the aftermath is far from over. I have tried 
my very best to refer only to correct facts and numbers, but any possible 
mistakes are mine and I take the responsibility for them. 
 
The structure of my thesis is the following: In this chapter, I describe my work, 
data gathering process and some ethical considerations involved and introduce 
my fieldwork site more in depth: The City of Flint, its tumultuous history from the 
automobile industry’s blooming years to the city’s abandonment and 
deindustrialization. Chapter 2 is my theory chapter, where I discuss the main 
anthropological theories I will be using to support my analysis in the following 
chapters. In chapters 3-5 theories of neoliberalism, the role of the state and 
anthropological study of disasters are interwoven into the analysis where I piece 
together my ethnographic findings with the aforementioned theoretical concepts. 
In chapter 3 I delve into the water crisis and provide a brief summary of. I tie the 
ethnographic description to theoretical discussions about disasters and 
vulnerability. Chapter 4 focuses on the concept of the state and its role in the 
formation of the water crisis, through theorizing it as a complex set of processes 
instead of as a unitary force. My aim is to anthropologically study how people 
see and experience the state in their lives, as opposed to providing a focus on 
the state itself, from the inside. As a part of the state, I also consider citizenship 
and vulnerable subjects as produced by the actions of the state. Chapter 5 
takes the state-centered discussion a step further, analyzing the neoliberal 
practices and austerity policies through which the city of Flint has been 
governed for decades. Finally, chapter 6 is where I draw together my findings 
and present answers to my research questions.  
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1.2 The Vehicle City: History of Flint 
 
In this subchapter, I introduce my fieldwork site and take a brief look at the 
historical background of the water crisis. I trace the city’s history from the early 
horse-carriage production days to its deindustrialization as I believe it is crucial 
to situate all disasters in history. Many people in Finland do not even know 
where Flint is located, yet in America, it is well known for its automobiles, and 
today, unfortunately, for its high crime and water problems.  
 
When I spoke with the residents in Flint, a great majority of them mentioned the 
remarkable history of the city as the birthplace of America’s automobile industry 
and the labor union movement. In fact, Saginaw Street, the main street in 
downtown is known for its landmark: A big, black arch that reads “Flint Vehicle 
City”. However, the great city of carriages and cars is now, according to many, 
just a shadow of what it was in its heyday. When it comes to the water crisis, it 
is important to be aware of the city’s history and background, and therefore I will 
here present a short summary of how the Vehicle City has changed throughout 
the years. 
 
Flint is located in Mid-Michigan, along the Flint River and it is the largest city of 
Genesee County. Originally Flint was occupied by the indigenous Ojibwe and 
the whites arrived in the area in the early 19th century. Soon after that, Flint 
became the home for the manufacturing of horse-drawn carriages. The carriage 
production paved the way for the developing automobile industry in the early 
20th century, the biggest and best-known manufacturer being General Motors 
(GM), established in 1908. Flint was also known for its labor movement and the 
famous sit-down strike of 1936-1937 against GM (Clark 2018). 
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I met George, a middle-aged man in his office one afternoon for a chat. I had 
got in touch with him after another informant mentioned him to me as a possible 
person to talk to. George manages a non-profit organization working to support 
veterans of war, something that he feels strongly about, being a veteran himself. 
During the crisis, George has helped to distribute water, driving his van around 
the city with other volunteers, handing out state-supplied water bottles to 
homebound people. Despite the March sunshine outside, George’s face 
remains serious and he does not crack a smile during the entire interview. He 
phrased his thoughts about Flint’s history this way: 
 
For Flint being what it is, we’re historically one of the greatest cities in the 
last hundred years. We created the middle class for the country... 
[sighing] So many things that we’ve given and presented to the nation as 
a city, based on our economics, industry. Everyone in the world is driving 
a car because of Flint, Michigan. I call it the Silicon Valley of the industrial 
age, because without Flint, you won’t have the technology. GM gave us 
the functionality of the vehicles, the updated technology. 
 
During the 1950s and 60s, Flint was the home to some 200,000 people and its 
economy boomed: About 77 000 people worked for General Motors in the city 
area. GM had started producing war equipment during World War II and as 
even more workforce was needed than before, Flint now suffered from a 
shortage of employees (Michigan Civil Rights Commission 2017; Clark 2018). 
GM eventually also constructed homes in the neighborhoods for its workers and 
at the time, segregation was a standard practice.  
 
Things took a turn in the second half of the 20th century as GM started building 
its new plants outside of the city borders as well as shutting down already 
existing plants. In addition, by the early 1980s the auto giant began transferring 
its jobs abroad, leading to even more closings in Flint. During the 
deindustrialization, GM cut altogether about 70,000 jobs in the Flint metro area 
9 
 
(Pulido 2016). Several of my informants mentioned the leaving of GM as the 
starting point for when things started spiraling downwards in the city. There is 
historical evidence to support that claim. The former city of vehicles has now 
lost over 50 % of its population since its glory days in the 60s (Pulido 2016, p. 
3). 
 
Kay is a local woman in her late 50s, working for the Genesee County on health 
matters. We meet one day at a local bar/restaurant over lunch and Kay seems 
to be in a good mood, laughing and talking a lot. Yet she tells me that dealing 
with the water crisis, even though she has been on the lucky end of people, has 
taken its toll on her and that she “used to be a lot more trusting and positive”. 
She also compares the pain of the situation to breaking her spine years ago, 
pointing out that the crisis certainly hurts more. She told me about the collapse 
of the auto industry as follows: 
 
This is an unusual community, because it was based around the auto 
factories. It acted like a magnet for people who weren’t very educated. 
My own father included, he couldn’t read or write, so he came to Flint 
because he could get a pretty high-paying job in a factory. It was nice 
because it was able to boost the next generation. I had opportunities 
because of that, I could go to college. Unfortunately, when those auto 
factories left, you were left with a whole population of folks that didn’t 
have transferable skills. [pausing] So it was more economically 
devastating than in might have been… if people had more options. 
 
People in Flint seem to generally agree on the importance of GM for the 
economy, the reputation and history of Flint, and most associate GM leaving 
with the downward spiraling economy. I discussed the history with Carroll, a 
lovely, silvery-haired woman in her late sixties, retired and living with her 
rescued cats quite close to downtown. We met over coffee in a local 
bookshop/café and she brought me a tin of cookies, made by a friend of hers. 
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The small gesture made me feel happy, appreciated, and was enough to 
convince me that these people are one of a kind. Carroll has been a city 
resident since the 1980s and has a lot to say about the history of Flint. She 
proposed a slightly different perspective to the relationship between GM and the 
economy, suggesting that the bad economic conditions preceded the exit of GM 
from the city, not vice versa. Here I am quoting her: 
 
And one of the things that a lot of people lament here in Flint is that you 
know, GM left us and… [pauses] One of the things that a lot of the 
younger people don’t understand is that in 1973 when there was an oil 
embargo here in the United States, we had 37 percent local 
unemployment. 37 percent! It’s horrific!  
— — 
And it wasn’t that the GM left us… there was no economy here. You 
know, downtown we had the stores, we had refreshments, we had 
theaters that actually had people in them, you know, watching movies. 
We had Carlton stationery store which had art supplies as well as 
stationery, you know… And back in the 60s and 70s people bought 
beautiful furniture, you know, it was just an entirely different era.  
And since so much of our employment was concentrated in the auto 
industry, and you can’t produce a car if nobody has the money to buy a 
car. So, it wasn’t that GM abandoned us, there was no economy to 
support it. And we never really got back on our feet. 
 
Whether it was the economy that left the city first or the auto manufacturer, 
since the leaving of GM, Flint has suffered from a variety of problems: poverty, 
depopulation, white flight, high crime rates and financial crises. All this was 
culminated during the 2008 global recession. Even more GM jobs were lost, 
leaving only some 6,500 positions in Flint, as GM declared bankruptcy the 
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following year (Pulido 2016, p. 3). As of 2017, there were some 96,448 
residents in Flint with a devastating 41.9 % of them living below the federal 
poverty level. About 54.3 % of the residents are of African American descent, 
40.4 % are white and the rest belong to other groups of origin (US Census 
Bureau, accessed 19.06.2018). The constantly declining population has led to 
disinvestment and even greater abandonment by the state. For example, the 
number of officers in the police department has been cut drastically, public 
schools are being shut down and the residents were still during the time of my 
fieldwork made to pay incredible amounts of money for their (undrinkable) 
water. 
  
Except for a few spots downtown, everywhere in Flint the marks left by 
deindustrialization were clearly visible during my stay. Below is an excerpt from 
my field diary from when I was taken by car on a “sightseeing” tour around 
different areas in Flint, together with Carroll and her friend Ron. Ron is a tall, 
black man, some ten years younger than Carroll, with a loud laugh and lots of 
things to say.  
 
As we are sitting in the car on a sunny Friday afternoon, Ron and Carroll 
talk non-stop and point to me different buildings. Houses where their 
relatives used to live, abandoned schools (and which famous basketball 
players used to attend them), small shops where people would fight and 
shoot all the time, notorious streets and the better-off areas with 
decorated villas, which don’t have any value these days anymore 
because of the city’s current situation. 
 
We drive for almost an hour and Carroll mentions at every big street 
whether it divides the city on the north-south or east-west axis. Both Ron 
and Carroll repeat a fair few times how there used to be houses tightly 
side by side to each other and how Flint once was the home for some 
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200 000 people and the greatest industrial city in the U.S., the ultimate 
dream of so many people. 
 
But as I look out of the window, I am struggling to see the glory of the 
once great vehicle city. Anywhere I look, I see houses in such 
devastatingly poor condition that it is almost impossible to imagine 
anyone living there. Yet, some of the houses look inhabited, with sheets 
draped over the windows and ragged cars parked on the sidewalk. We 
drive past some better-off areas as well, but I also see whole 
neighborhoods of houses almost falling apart: burnt roofs, walls sprayed 
with graffiti, boards over the windows and huge piles of trash bags on the 
porches. As I look at the parched grass, I see an unbelievable amount of 
scrunched plastic bottles and trash glittering in the sunlight, almost 
looking like small stars trying to shed some light to the tormented city. 
(Field notes, 23.03.2018) 
 
 
Abandoned houses/photo: Bea Bergholm 
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1.3 Data, methods and analysis 
 
I arrived in Flint on a February night, after an all-day long snowstorm and an 
almost 30-hour long travel. I had no contacts to the city whatsoever, and I had 
never even been overseas before. Therefore, finding interviewees and 
informants was a step by step process in which I had a lot of help from the 
people of Flint that I met. Almost everyone I talked to came up with names and 
phone numbers for people who I could contact if I wanted to. Everyone was 
genuinely helpful and supportive of my research intentions, even though I feared 
beforehand that the residents might be skeptic about another outsider, as the 
water crisis has attracted a lot of attention and unwanted visitors.  
 
During my fieldwork, the issues I faced mostly had to do with the practicalities of 
living in a foreign city. Transportation was the biggest issue. I did not have a car 
at my disposal and I was relying on the city buses, Uber and walking as much 
as I felt safe to. As Flint is a city built around the automobile industry, the bus 
lines are not very comprehensive and only small parts of the city have paved 
pathways for pedestrians. Therefore, most of my fieldwork took place in the city 
center, around the campus of the University of Michigan-Flint. I conducted my 
interviews primarily in various cafés and public spaces, but I was also a few 
times invited to my informants’ offices around the city. 
 
Ideally, I could have explored the city more if I had had a car and felt safer to do 
so. The people of the city live fairly dispersed around it and the city center, 
“downtown”, is mostly a place for the economically better-off people. Even 
though the area has been greatly renovated in the last few years and now 
features several cozy cafés, an upgraded performing arts theater, The Capitol, 
and even a new location for the iconic Farmers’ Market, there are still for 
example no big grocery stores within the city limits. Most people take the car to 
Walmart or Kroger, which are both located in Flint Township, some 6,5 
kilometers from the city center. 
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Even if the environment of my fieldwork was spatially quite limited, I feel like I 
was able to gain a good, basic understanding of the life in the city by exploring 
several interesting public places, such as the Sloan Museum, the Flint Institute 
of Arts, the Public Library and the university campus. In addition to the 
interviews and participant observation, my study is supported by various 
informal interactions and chats, which provided me with invaluable background 
information. 
  
When starting my fieldwork, I was originally interested in focusing on the water 
crisis as an issue of environmental racism, as it had been framed as such 
broadly in the U.S. media. While I do recognize that the situation had everything 
to do with environmental racism, I quite quickly realized that I must have a more 
open-minded attitude and let people focus on anything about the water crisis 
they felt was important. Therefore, I kept my interviews quite open-ended and 
generalized and tried to grasp whatever topic my interviewees brought up as 
significant. I tried my best not to direct my informants in any ways and give them 
space to associate freely. Sometimes that lead to us discussing for example 
Mexican food and psychic reading for a long time, but I only found it enjoyable 
to discuss something other than water issues for a change — and I hope my 
interviewees did too.  
 
My main data consisted of 13 semi-structured, recorded interviews, 
approximately an hour long each. Out of those, one interview included three 
participants, and another included two interviewees. In addition, I did two shorter 
and more informal interviews which I took notes of but did not record. I also did 
daily participant observation, took notes in my field diary and attended two semi-
formal meetings discussing the water crisis and one movie screening followed 
by a discussion. I also took photographs of the city, followed the local news daily 
and watched documentaries and short films focusing on the city and its issues. 
After my fieldwork I started transcribing the interviews and systematically 
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analyzing my data relying mainly on the grounded theory method. Grounded 
theory allows an understanding of the phenomenon to emerge through 
analyzing the already collected data, as opposed to first adopting a theoretical 
framework and then interpreting the phenomenon through it. As I noticed 
reoccurring themes in my data, I connected it to the discussions of neoliberalism 
and state politics and then began deepening my knowledge of the said 
anthropological theories.  
 
My aim was to include people from diverse ethnic and social backgrounds and 
viewpoints, which I feel that I succeeded in. I interviewed quite evenly both men 
and women, white and black Flint residents, some born and raised in the city. 
The age span of my interviewees was also comprehensive, between anything 
from approximately 30 to 70. Additionally, the life situations and economic and 
social backgrounds of my interviewees were different: There were for example 
middle-class academics, low-income retirees and mothers with small children. 
Following the code of ethics set by the American Anthropological Association 
(AAA Statement on Ethics 2012), I made sure to always begin my interviews 
with telling about myself, my project and its intents. I also asked my 
interviewees if they wanted to appear with their real names in my thesis or with 
pseudonyms. Even though some people wanted me to conceal their workplace 
or other background information, no one felt the need for a pseudonym in this 
case. 
 
 
1.4 Ethical considerations 
 
My main concern before and during my fieldwork was a dilemma most likely 
familiar to many researchers living among people facing a crisis and economic 
and social hardships: Am I exploiting these people for my own advancement? Is 
there anything I can give back?  
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Before my trip, I had tried to read as much about the case as possible and I had 
come across statements that were very critical of any outsiders and researchers 
coming to Flint. The water crisis has (especially since the federal declaration 
of emergency in 2016) attracted unwanted attention and people were wary of 
exploitative researchers and journalists crowding the city. I decided to ask a few 
of my interviewees about their feelings about the global attention. All my 
informants told me that any attention that might help the city to get economic 
and social help is good, but helpers should be aware of where their donations 
are going. Demitrius, one of my informants, answered my question and pointed 
out the many international celebrities that have raised money for the city: 
 
When people donate to the water crisis, the job not getting done. 
Regardless of how much money they donate to us, it’s all about the 
government and what they gonna do with it. They gonna really get the 
money and fix the pipes or… As anybody sees, the pipes are not fixed 
yet and we’ve had probably over a hundred million dollars altogether 
when it comes to the funding. I feel like I don’t think that celebrities 
should donate money here, because they not doing what they should for 
the people. 
 
I realized during my fieldwork that unfortunately there are very few options for a 
single researcher like me to notably help the city in its recovery efforts. It felt 
bad, but I tried to remind myself that educating myself is the least I can do and 
that is exactly what I am doing. I suppose that the residents’ warm reaction to 
me might have had something to do with the fact that they did not consider me 
as much as an exploiter as they may consider e.g. journalists who get paid for 
their work in Flint. I made it explicitly clear to my informants that I am conducting 
research with grant money and my own savings and the only benefit I will get is 
to be able to graduate. Additionally, I explained to them that the water crisis has 
not been in the news in Finland as much as it (according to me) should have 
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been, and that my research is an effort to make it better known, even just for my 
fellow students and professors2.  
I am extremely grateful to all those people who supported my research during 
the fieldwork and shared with me their thoughts and experiences. I wish the City 
of Flint and all its residents nothing but the best in the future. 
 
 
 
Downtown Flint with its “Flint Vehicle City” arch/photo: Bea Bergholm 
 
  
                                                          
2 In 2016 after the federal emergency declaration, some Finnish news media, such as YLE, 
Helsingin Sanomat and MTV featured the Flint crisis, and Ilta-Sanomat and Marmai noted it in 
2018, but there has been no follow-up news about the case since then. 
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2 Theoretical frameworks 
 
In this chapter I briefly introduce the main theoretical approaches I will be using 
to support my arguments about the Flint water crisis, namely theories of the 
state and neoliberalism, intrinsically linked together both in theory and practice. 
After a general overview of these concepts, in the analysis chapters I will situate 
them more specifically within the framework of the water crisis and its 
background. My thesis aims to construct a holistic picture of the water crisis as a 
case of state malfunction, money-driven decision-making and human rights 
violation.  
 
2.1 State-society division and state processes 
 
“States remain the metaphorical elephant in the anthropological room of the 
social science household; they are observed peripherally, mentioned in passing, 
but the subject rarely broached directly. States are sometimes half-heartedly 
acknowledged, but rarely studied anthropologically as discrete objects of study”, 
argues Bouchard (2011, p. 185-186).  
 
For a long time indeed, anthropology as a discipline lacked a focus on the state 
as an object of study, mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the nature of state was 
understood as something non-objective, or as Radcliffe-Brown put it in the 
1940s, as “a fiction of the philosophers”. Secondly, because of anthropological 
ethnographic methods, the state was thought to be beyond the reach of 
anthropologists, better suited for political scientists to study (Bouchard 2011). 
One of the central aims for this thesis is to take up the challenging study of the 
state and its processes, through a focus on “ordinary people” at the grassroots 
level in Flint, Michigan. “A state formation is the result of myriads of situations 
where social actors negotiate power and meaning. This shifts the focus of 
analysis to the many practices of power and the mundane and ritual forms that 
constitute the state”, argue Krohn-Hansen and Nustad (2005, p. 12). In following 
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this vein, I examine the everyday practices of the Flint residents as active 
citizens and how they perceive the state of Michigan as a neoliberal actor. I 
emphasize that I do not study the state institution as an anthropological concept, 
but rather its policies and the people’s perceptions of it. In the analysis chapters 
of this thesis, I will delve into these perceptions more thoroughly. 
 
Due to its historical origins, anthropology did not for a long time acknowledge 
the state as a suitable subject for ethnographic research. The expectation was 
that anthropology was to focus on so-called stateless or primitive societies (Das 
& Poole 2004, p. 4). French anthropologist Pierre Clastres challenged this 
ethnocentric view which equates primitive societies with a lack of the state. He 
claimed that some societies without a state or leadership (sometimes actively 
against it) are in fact both affluent and complex (Clastres 1989 [1974]). For a 
long time after Radcliffe-Brown’s critical remark, anthropologists pondered on 
the necessity of studying the state. Radcliffe-Brown insisted on not treating the 
state as a concrete object and his point has been further elaborated by Abrams 
(1988) in arguing that instead of an objective entity, there exists an idea of the 
state and different government institutions. These institutions in turn seem to 
exist as a unified whole because the state idea makes them appear more 
coherent and legitimate (Krohn-Hansen & Nustad 2005, p. 5). Abrams’ 
emphasis can be seen as approaching Foucault’s notion of governmentality, a 
certain kind of ubiquitous power of the state, manifested in institutions, subjects 
and knowledge production (ibid., p. 6).  
 
Tracing the history of state-focused studies, Mitchell distinguishes two 
approaches that have dominated in American social science since the 1950s. 
The first approach called for a total abandonment of the state, arguing that the 
term itself was too ideological and that it should instead be replaced with the 
idea of “political system”. However, the new term was too imprecise to establish 
itself as a valid alternative, so the second response to the difficulty of studying 
the state was instead to “bring back the state”: The research defined the state in 
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several different ways and saw it as being autonomous from society. 
Simultaneously, this approach theorized state and society to be separate 
entities, an understanding that has been criticized and questioned in 
contemporary anthropology (Mitchell 1999, p. 170, 172).  
 
In theorizing the perceived separation between state and society, the work of 
Timothy Mitchell greatly helps me. He focuses on the modern techniques of 
governing that make the state appear as a fixed entity and distinct from society. 
He questions the state as taken for granted and proposes that we instead 
examine the practices “through which the uncertain yet powerful distinction 
between state and society is produced” (Mitchell 1999, p. 170). According to 
Mitchell, the state should not be seen as a coherent and autonomous actor, yet 
the agency associated with the state helps to create the apparent boundary 
between state and society. This way the state is seen as an autonomous actor 
intervening in societal life, and statist approaches to studying the state take this 
view as a reality. Although Mitchell’s text is quite old (1999), his thoughts are still 
echoed in the current theoretical literature of the state. For instance, focusing on 
the state-society separation, he argues that we need an approach to the state 
that “refuses to take for granted this dualism, yet accounts for why social and 
political reality appears in this binary form” (Mitchell 1999, p. 176).  
 
I argue that in the case of Flint, the state (that is, the state of Michigan) is and 
should be seen not as a coherent actor, but as a cluster of different entities that 
through their daily actions reproduce the dichotomy of state and society. The 
residents see the state as separate from them, a force made up of mostly 
privileged people who have very little compassion or willingness to support the 
city on decline. In Flint the state is seen as consisting of different institutions and 
actors which all played a role in the unfolding of the crisis. The biggest blame for 
the situation falls on the state’s governor and emergency managers, as will 
become clear in the analysis chapters. Using expressions like “they”, “the 
officials” and “those in power”, the people I spoke with made it very clear that 
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they feel like the state and the emergency managers acted as an outside force 
and overruled the complaints from the locals. 
  
Also writing about the relationship between state and society, Ferguson and 
Gupta examine the verticality and encompassment of states in their influential 
piece “Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal 
Governmentality” (2002). According to them, the aforementioned two concepts 
are often emphasized in academic discourses on the state. Verticality is defined 
as the idea of the state being “above” civil society, and in that case all planning 
happens top down. Encompassment again refers to the idea of the state being 
located within a “series of circles that begins with family and local community 
and ends with a system of nation-states” (Ferguson & Gupta 2002, p. 982). 
State-society relations have been popular in discussions of the state especially 
in political sciences and the opposition between state and society brings with it 
an idea of vertical encompassment, the state being above society (ibid.). 
  
Contemporary anthropological approaches to the state draw our attention to 
practices and processes rather than fixed institutions. Krohn-Hansen and 
Nustad explain this argument well in saying that states are constructed as the 
result of complex sets of practices and processes and formed in countless 
situations where different social actors and power relationships work. So, 
instead of seeing and analyzing institutions perceived as the state, we should 
focus on everyday practices of power (Krohn-Hansen & Nustad 2005, p. 12). 
This is exactly what I am striving to do in my thesis, focusing on how the 
residents of Flint see the state through its mundane practices during the water 
crisis and how they react to these actions. Chapter 4 is where I elaborate this 
more in depth.  
  
Trouillot calls for a very similar approach as Krohn-Hansen and Nustad, in 
stating that the state is not an apparatus, but rather a set of processes. Even 
though it is seen to be linked to systems that sometimes are governmental, the 
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state is still not necessarily bound by a certain institution nor is it fixed to a 
particular place. Trouillot continues: “At that level, its materiality resides much 
less in institutions than in the reworking of processes and relations of power so 
as to create new spaces for the deployment of power” (Trouillot 2001, p. 127). 
For Trouillot, seeing the state as a set of practices means that the analytical 
task is to identify what these state-effects are and how and where they are 
produced (ibid.). 
   
Krohn-Hansen and Nustad point out a few prominent difficulties in the 
anthropological study of the state. One of them is that anthropologists have 
found it challenging to conceptually grasp “the state” and therefore the idea of 
the state has been flexible and contested, its usage even incoherent. According 
to the authors, all this calls for more detailed and critical explorations of the state 
and its social formations, studied through the lens of ethnography (Krohn-
Hansen & nustad 2005, p. 5). The critique toward anthropological inquiries of 
the state echoes some of the same themes as critique toward the concept of 
neoliberalism: Not enough focus on it and ultimately seeing is as too 
predominant, taken for granted. Several scholars (see e.g. Joseph & Nugent 
1994, Mitchell 1999 and Trouillot 2001) have criticized the assumption of the 
state as an a priori concept, “a distinct, fixed and unitary entity that defines the 
terrain in which other institutions function” (Sharma & Gupta 2006, p. 9). This 
has led to an updated approach to the state, focusing on its ideological and 
material aspects that differentiate it from other institutional forms and the power 
relations derived from it. 
 
2.2 Anthropological approaches to neoliberalism 
  
The word “neoliberalism” has increasingly attracted anthropologists and 
exploded in popularity since the millennium. Despite its popularity, the term itself 
does not have one single definition which all social scientists would agree on. 
Most discussions, however, associate neoliberalism with the historical 
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conjuncture of the 1970s and 1980s. A period which was characterized by the 
oil crisis, fiscal hardships and a crisis of the welfare system, to name a few. 
Anthropologist Sherry Ortner has called anthropological studies about 
neoliberalism “dark anthropology”: “...that is, anthropology that emphasizes the 
harsh and brutal dimensions of human experience, and the structural and 
historical conditions that produce them” (Ortner 2016, p. 49). 
 
Schwegler writes about the trickiness of defining the term, especially after 
scholars have refused to distinguish all its multiple meanings. Precisely because 
neoliberalism is such an ambiguous term, I want to make it clear to the reader in 
which meaning I use the term in my thesis. Schwegler makes a distinction 
between two modes of neoliberalism, and I believe my theorization of the term 
falls somewhere in the middle: 
 
Narrowly defined, neoliberalism is used to describe specific policies 
“marked by a shift from Keynesian welfarism towards a political agenda 
favouring the relatively unfettered operation of markets” (Larner 2000 in 
Schwegler). More broadly, neoliberalism denotes a rationality of 
governance that “involves extending and disseminating market values to 
all institutions and social action” (Brown 2003 in Schwegler). Whereas 
the former definition confines the discussion of neoliberalism to specific 
policies, the latter identifies neoliberalism as an all-encompassing social, 
moral, and political faith (Schwegler 2008, p. 682). 
  
Also, James Ferguson notes the big variation in how the word neoliberalism is 
used in contemporary social sciences. In the strict sense, it refers to a 
macroeconomic doctrine which includes promoting a free, private market and 
reducing the state. Another way of conceiving neoliberalism is seeing it as a 
regime of practice, different from the doctrine itself yet associated with it. 
Understood this way, neoliberalism is a set of public policies that strive to enrich 
the holders of capital, while simultaneously leading to reduced public services, 
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increasing inequality and generally worsened life conditions for the poor and 
working classes (Ferguson 2009, p. 170). 
 
Although neoliberalism is most commonly understood as reducing the state in 
favor of a strong private market, the Flint case brings forth another perspective 
to this view. As there was no company or privatization immediately behind the 
water switch, the case can be seen as an example of a state adopting neoliberal 
policies in order to alleviate an economically struggling city. What became clear 
to me was that the locals thought that the state governed the city as if it was a 
business, focusing on cutting costs in any possible ways. I argue that this 
business-minded way of running the city was wrong and unjust in the Flint 
residents’ opinion and led them to lose their trust in the state. I will explain this 
point further in my thesis. 
  
Back to the definitions of neoliberalism, David Harvey, known for his studies on 
neoliberalism, defines the term as follows:  
 
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic 
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, 
free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and 
preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices (Harvey 
2005, p. 2). 
 
He further argues that neoliberalism values market exchange as “an ethic in 
itself” and neoliberal thought seeks to “bring all human action into the domain of 
the market”, as the belief is that social wellbeing will be maximized when the 
scope of market transactions is maximized as well (Harvey 2005). 
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According to Harvey, the first neoliberal experiment in state formation can be 
traced back to Chile in 1973 and a coup against the democratically elected 
leftist government which eventually also led to the freeing of markets. A group of 
U.S. economists (“the Chicago boys”) helped to reconstruct the Chilean 
economy along the lines of free market, privatization and facilitation of foreign 
investment. This led the way for the U.S. president Ronald Reagan and the U.K. 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to eventually opt for more neoliberal policies 
in the 80s (Harvey 2005, p. 8-9). These two leaders are often framed as the 
poster children of the rise of neoliberal policies which were adopted in order to 
increase profitability through downsizing, offshoring, shutting down production 
facilities and laying people off. At the same time the state functions were shrunk, 
and social support programs cut, resulting in people losing whatever resources 
they had before (Ortner 2016, p. 53).3 
  
I believe one cannot write about neoliberalism without mentioning Michel 
Foucault and his lectures at the Collège de France in the late 1970s. These 
lectures were named “The Birth of Biopolitics”, yet they focused mostly on 
neoliberalism and can be attributed to the “return of the state” as an analytical 
concept. Foucault examined the most significant forms of neoliberalism, that is, 
the theoretical schools of German ordoliberalism, the Austrian school influenced 
by Hayek, and American neoliberalism, with a focus on the Chicago school. 
Foucault also introduced the term “governmentality”. He saw the government of 
the state as the exercise of political sovereignty over a certain territory with its 
population. He saw a distinction between two modes of government: 
government of the state and government of the self (Foucault 2008). 
  
This governmentality-focused perspective, strongly associated with 
Foucault, focuses on the neoliberal shift in governmentality, where the 
operations of government are economized, and an emphasis put on an 
                                                          
3 I have intentionally kept the introduction of neoliberalism short in this thesis. For a more detailed 
explanation on the birth of neoliberalism I would suggest anthropologist David Graeber’s article 
“Neoliberalism, or: The Bureaucratization of the World” (2009) 
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entrepreneurial model of individual and community responsibility. Another 
theorization, discussed by anthropologist Aihwa Ong, views neoliberalism as “a 
malleable technology of government”, that produces new forms of citizenship 
(Kingfisher & Maskovsky 2008, p. 118-119, see Ong 2006).  
  
Anthropological neoliberal studies have been criticized (even within the 
discipline) for viewing neoliberalism as an all-encompassing force from the 
outside and for not theorizing the term sufficiently. Tejaswini Ganti asks if there 
is any utility left for neoliberalism as an analytical category, if it is being used to 
explain almost every phenomenon in our contemporary world. He also raises 
the question of why anthropologists have chosen the term neoliberalism to 
describe the contemporary world? Why are they not using “late capitalism” 
instead? And how do these two terms differ from each other? (Ganti 2014). 
  
According to Ganti, a significant difference between the concepts of late 
capitalism and neoliberalism is that the former is a fairly neutral term, whereas 
the latter is theoretically charged and commonly used in critical remarks of 
capitalist political structures, modes of governance and the role of the state 
(Ganti 2014). Mathieu Hilgers argues that the word has largely been applied to 
mean a radicalized form of capitalism that is based on deregulation and 
restricting state intervention, as well as an emphasis on individual responsibility 
(Hilgers 2011, p. 352). James Ferguson holds a different view toward the 
relationship between the two terms, arguing that the word neoliberalism has 
been used as “a sloppy synonym for capitalism itself”, something that is used in 
current anthropological literature as a “kind of abstract causal force that comes 
in from outside”, creating inequality (Ferguson 2009, p. 171). 
  
In general, very little attention has been paid to specifying what the term means 
in anthropological theory. Hoffman, DeHart and Collier are calling for a focus on 
the definition itself: “...Although ever more anthropological studies are 
concerned with neoliberalism, there have been few steps made toward an 
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anthropology of neoliberalism, that is, an anthropology in which the very 
definition of neoliberalism is put in question and made an object of investigation” 
(Hoffman, DeHart & Collier 2006, p. 9). 
  
In addition to questioning the term itself, anthropological neoliberal studies have 
been criticized for not paying enough attention to neoliberalism’s variations but 
instead seeing it as a something solid and uncontested. Kingfisher and 
Maskovsky stress the need to move beyond the view of neoliberalism as a 
unitary structural force and focus instead of the process of it, its “contradictions, 
fractures, partialities, contingencies” and the social forces affecting it (Kingfisher 
& Maskovsky 2008, p. 119).  
  
Criticism directed towards theories of neoliberalism has also noted how 
neoliberalism should always be put into context, geographical and historical, as 
it manifests itself very differently depending on where in the world one is. As 
Hilgers reminds us: 
 
Whereas some authors present neoliberalism as the decay of an 
inflexible state or as the inexorable advance of its right hand, it appears 
that neoliberal impact can never be understood in radical separation from 
historical configurations and has to be evaluated differently depending on 
context (Hilgers 2012, p. 81). 
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3 The Flint water crisis  
 
The Flint Water Crisis, which began in April 2014 and is still going through its 
aftermath, is a tragic example of a state’s neoliberal policies, environmental 
injustice and mismanagement. The effects of the crisis, such as public health 
problems, financial instability and lack of trust in the state, will still be seen for 
decades to come. In this chapter I situate this water crisis in the context of 
disaster anthropology, arguing for an extension of anthropological studies on 
disasters and catastrophes — an extension that would include man-made crises 
in the discussion, as opposed to only focusing on natural disasters. Man-made 
and natural disasters share many aspects in common, such as their historicity, 
their transformative power and the possibility to reveal hidden power structures. 
This chapter answers such questions as: Why do the residents believe the 
water crisis was a deliberate poisoning? How does the city’s history play into it? 
What does the water crisis reveal about the society’s power structures if 
considered as a disaster? 
In the first subchapter, I aspire to provide an approximately chronological 
summary of the many causes and events that contributed to the crisis. This 
chapter with its ethnographic description of the everyday struggles of Flint 
residents also contextualizes the following discussion of citizenship and 
vulnerability and their connection to the practices of the state. 
 
3.1 “Don’t drink it!”: Water crisis timeline 
 
In April 2014, Flint had been depending on Detroit’s system as their water 
source for nearly 50 years with a mutual contract between The Detroit Water 
and Sewerage Department, DWSD4 (owned by the city) and the city of Flint. 
The DWSD drew its water from Lake Huron, one of the five Great Lakes on the 
                                                          
4 DWSD was restructured in 2014 after Detroit’s bankruptcy and it merged with several other 
counties in Michigan to form an independent regional water authority called Great Lakes Water 
Authority, GLWA. 
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border of the U.S. and Canada. However, the officials claimed that water from 
Detroit was becoming overly expensive. The residents of Flint had for a long 
time complained about their water bill rates, which were among the highest in 
the entire country, even though some 42 % of the city residents lived under the 
federal poverty level (Clark 2018, p. 15).  
Consequently, according to the officials, the cost of building an own pipeline 
would be more economical for the city than staying on the Detroit system. They 
started planning a new pipeline system, called Karegnondi Water Authority, 
KWA. Predicting other cities to join the new water service as well, the officials 
championed it as a possible source of income for Flint. However, the new 
system had not even been built yet and it would take a few years for it to be 
completed. Until that, the city’s emergency manager made the decision to use 
the Flint River as a temporary source. On April 25th in 2014, Flint’s Mayor of 
that time, Dayne Walling, turned the switch to end the water distribution from 
Detroit and switch it to the local river. A few days from that, water from the Flint 
River started flowing through the city’s old water plant and into the residents’ 
homes (Adams 2014; Michigan Radio 2015). 
Flint’s own treatment plant on Dort Highway had sat idle since the city began its 
contract with the DWSD decades ago. It remained as a backup resource for 
water emergencies and in 2014 it was thus put to use again as the temporary 
switch to the Flint River took place. However, Flint’s utilities administrator 
warned the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) about using 
the water plant, saying that it would take a much longer time than anticipated to 
upgrade it and train needed staff (Clark 2018, p. 17). Still, other officials gave 
their approval for the water plant and the switch was made. The local media 
noted the new water source as well, and for example the Flint Journal headline 
read: “Switch to Flint River Water Represents a New Era in Flint” (Clark 2018, p. 
18). Sadly enough, it was not the kind of new era everyone was hoping for.   
Soon after the switch to the river was done, Flint residents started noticing odd 
color, smell and taste in their household water and complained about it. In 
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response, the officials assured people that the water was safe and drinkable. In 
August, the water tested positive for E.coli bacteria and the city advised the 
residents to boil their water before using it. A few months later, the General 
Motors plant in Flint announced that they would stop using the water, as the 
chlorine added to the water was corroding their engine parts (CNN 2014; 
Michigan Radio 2015). 
The news about the big automobile company switching to another water source 
triggered alarm in the city residents. Even after GM left the water system, the 
officials continued publicly assuring people that the water was fine to drink and 
wash with.  
I spoke to Heather, a local professor and researcher herself and she phrased 
her thoughts this way: 
 
One thing that a number of us have commented on, that’s still, I find it 
really fascinating, is that we learned really early on that GM had decided 
to stop using the Flint water because it was corroding the cars that they 
were building.  
And we, a bunch of professors, highly educated, well-informed people, 
our response was “Huh? Wow.” That was the response that we had. We 
all look back on that now and think “What, why the disconnect, why didn’t 
we just absolutely freak out and make some kinds of demands on our 
representative…” Like, why didn’t we just do something! We all just went 
“Huh? Woow.” 
I’m still really fascinated by that. I think we, the privileged we, must still 
have some… [pauses] faith in our elected officials and in the structures of 
our government…who we believe, or did, are mostly there for the 
good…Right? You know, like they wouldn’t be telling us that it was okay 
to drink this water if it’s not. 
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In early 2015, The MDEQ found high levels of total trihalomethanes (TTHM) in 
the Flint water. TTHM is a byproduct of water treatment and is associated with 
possible health problems, such as damage to the nervous system and 
increased risk of cancer. Even after that, the Mayor confirmed in a press 
conference that the water was safe. Despite pressure from the residents, the 
emergency manager refused to allow a switch back to the Detroit system, 
saying it would cost the city excessively (Smith 2015). 
In February 2015 some of the first tests in Flint residents’ homes were 
conducted and thy showed unacceptably high levels of lead. Later that year, 
researchers from Virginia Tech University conducted tests in over 300 homes 
and verified the excessively high levels. A Flint-based pediatrician published her 
research, stating that the lead levels in children had gone up since the water 
switch and that lead, being a neurotoxin, affects young children in several 
harmful ways. Her work was, however, repeatedly discredited by state officials 
before finally taken seriously (Smith 2015). 
In addition to TTHM and lead, the water switch caused a local hospital in Flint to 
report a peak in cases of Legionnaires’ disease, a pneumonia-like infection 
caused by contaminated water (CNN 2014). Then, in October 2015 the 
Michigan Governor Rick Snyder announced that the city would after a lot of 
pressure from the public switch back to Detroit water system, which they indeed 
did. However, the damage to the pipes was already done and the officials said 
that they did not know how long it would take for the lead levels to normalize 
again (Michigan Radio 2015; Smith 2015). 
In December of 2015, the City of Flint declared a state of emergency, soon 
followed by Genesee County, state of Michigan and federal emergency 
declarations (Michigan Civil Rights Commission 2017). 
Due to the city’s old lead pipes, the water from the highly corrosive Flint River 
should have been treated with anti-corrosion chemicals before using it. The 
water in the river is corrosive due to the high chloride levels in it. Chlorides 
normally do not cause issues in drinking water, but in large amounts they may 
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break down the metals in water lines. In northern latitudes, such as Michigan, 
water bodies are susceptible to chloride because of the road salt (sodium 
chloride) that has been used on roads for decades (Clark 2018, p. 34). Treating 
the water first, according to several sources, would have cost the state 
significantly less than dealing with the several unfolding effects of the water 
crisis. However, corrosion control was not used as the MDEQ had stated that it 
was not necessary. In addition, the water from the river was naturally more 
corrosive and more difficult to treat (especially for the insufficiently upgraded 
Flint water plant) than the water from Lake Huron (Clark 2018, p. 33). Corrosive 
water causes old pipes to rust and leak and the lack of corrosion control was 
therefore the technical reason for why the city’s water became lead tainted.  
Altogether, about 100,000 people were exposed to high levels of lead and at 
least twelve people have thus far died of Legionnaire’s disease5. Carroll told me 
during our interview that her partner died from diagnosed pneumonia, but that 
she herself suspects that he actually was one of the undocumented victims of 
Legionnaire’s. Another woman I talked with said that during the water crisis she 
suffered from what the doctors told her was “a virus” and that they refused to 
specify it, but according to her, the symptoms matched those of Legionnaire’s. 
Lead in turn is a cumulative neurotoxin, which means that once absorbed into 
the body, it is stored in bones and teeth where it accumulates over time. Being 
exposed to lead is likely to cause lifelong detrimental health effects, as there is 
no known safe level of exposure.   
Since my fieldwork I have been following the situation in Flint and at the time of 
writing this, in summer of 2019, the prosecutors announced that they will drop 
all charges against local and state officials involved in the case and start from 
scratch in order to expand the scope of the investigation. This understandably 
infuriated many residents (Davis 2019). At the beginning of the year, as a 
response to the crisis, the new Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer signed an 
                                                          
5 Legionnaire’s disease is a pneumonia-like bacterial lung infection that people might get if they breathe in 
mist/small droplets containing the bacteria. Legionella bacteria can be found in different water systems, 
such as hot tubs, fountains and rivers (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, accessed 25.03.2019). 
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executive directive which requires state employees to immediately report any 
threat to public health or safety (Egan 2019). Recent water sample tests in Flint 
show that the lead levels are within state and federal quality standards, at least 
in most parts of the city. The construction work for replacing the lead service 
lines is still going on and it is expected to be completed by the end of 2019, yet 
people are skeptical about whether replacing the lines will be enough.  
3.2 Living with lead 
 
The mundane problems that people of Flint faced (and are still facing today) 
have been widely written about in the media. Everything from health issues 
caused by lead and the chemicals in the water, to how difficult it is to take care 
of personal hygiene with no safe tap water available. Below I have gathered a 
few snippets from interviews I did, in which people tell me about their everyday 
practical struggles with bottled water. 
I was talking to Kirsten, a woman working in a local grocery store and she told 
me the following about her first experiences with the water issue: 
Bea: So, when did you first notice the odd color and smell of the water?  
Kirsten: Almost four years ago, it was like in May or June. So, then I 
started posting pictures and telling people about it on Facebook and then 
somebody from one of the clean water groups contacted me. See, the 
city of Flint had been telling us the water was safe to drink. And this lady 
contacted me and asked me if I wanted to have my water tested by 
somebody besides the city of Flint. So, of course I said yeah. 
 — — So, finally my husband quit drinking the water because I had been 
telling him ‘Don’t drink it, I don’t know what it is but there’s something with 
the water.’ And they hadn’t even tested it for most of the other stuff. You 
know, this was just lead. 
Bea: Did you or your husband experience any health issues? 
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Kirsten: Well, my hair was like down to my legs and it started getting 
really crunchy and falling out, so I would warm up bottled water and 
started rinsing with that. But it would take me like six water bottles to 
wash my hair! Just to wash my hair! You know, so I cut it all off. 
— — They kept sending us messages, like the boil water advisories. We 
were boiling our water and we had no idea there was a lead issue. I just 
knew it was an issue, I didn’t know what it was. And then there was like a 
metallic, sewage-y smell coming from the water. 
As it becomes clear in Kirsten’s comments, many of the residents had a “gut 
feeling” of something not being right with the water for a long time before they 
got a confirmation of it from the state.  
Rebecca is a mother of a little child and her family recently moved out to the 
suburbs, yet she is still working inside the city limits and owns a house in Flint 
(which, like many other houses, has no value anymore because of the crisis). 
Her experience with the water crisis has not been as personal as for many 
others but working with the locals she has heard many stories about the 
everyday struggles. Rebecca herself had to get her son tested for lead when he 
was only five months old. She described the experience as very hard, despite 
the fact that her son’s test came out normal. She then went on telling me about 
the issues the locals are facing: 
Then just in the schools, you can’t drink out of the fountain, so they got 
bottled water. And teachers said like “You wouldn’t believe the crinkling 
of the bottles!” There’s nothing you can do about it, because they need to 
be able to drink their water.” From the mundane crinkling up to not being 
able to give your kid a bath…Without having ten bottles of water… 
Rebecca also noted how the bad reputation of the former automobile city seems 
to persist, even get worse because of the water issue, and how it seems like it is 
the dominant discourse of everything Flint-related: 
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Now, when you travel anywhere, and you tell people you’re from Flint, 
you get that “Owww!” [Rebecca makes a sad face]. But then it also opens 
up an opportunity to talk to people about what happened. Sometimes it 
just gets really tiring to talk about that, like you know, we do have other 
things! [laughs] 
Also, Dewaun, a local entrepreneur and a father of two himself, noted the same 
thing and summarized it quite simply: “I’ve traveled the world and the first thing 
they say is about the water.” When we met with Dewaun, he had just got back 
from Puerto Rico, which was hit by Hurricane Maria in fall of 2017 and is still 
struggling.  
Besides the water crisis, Flint is also known for not being a particularly peaceful 
place. The city has been during the 21st century repeatedly considered as one 
of the most dangerous cities in the country. According to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, statistics of 2017 show that Flint was the sixth most violent city in 
America, of cities with a population of at least 50 000 (Adams 2018). Despite the 
prevalent discourse about the Vehicle City, there are many people affected by 
the water crisis who are trying to survive and persist the best they can.  
Shayne is a father to small children and he is one of the many locals who are 
trying to stay active and positive, help their neighbors and other people with the 
everyday tasks of the uncommon ways of using and not using water. We met at 
a local café and he told me he is one of the lucky people because for him it is 
fairly easy to go and pick up the weekly water bottles. For water distribution, the 
city residents were, at the time of my fieldwork, relying on state-maintained 
points-of-delivery (“PODs” as they are called), which were open at certain hours 
and would give everyone with a Flint address free cases of water bottles.  
I visited one of the PODs with Carroll and was surprised by how effortless it was 
— if you have a car at your disposal, that is. We basically just sat in the car, one 
employee came to ask Carroll for her address and then they loaded the bottles 
into the backseat. It was all done within a few minutes and afterward we drove 
to Carroll’s house, where I helped her carry the bottles onto her porch. The 
36 
 
residents who do not have a car or are homebound for any reason, have the 
possibility to call a service number and get the water delivered home. However, 
I did hear from quite a few people that the delivery service was not working as 
well as it should have. Just a few days after I left Flint in April 2018, the water 
distribution sites were permanently closed, despite objections from the 
residents.  
I have a couple of minivans, so it’s easy [getting water]. But then walking 
it [the cases of bottles] up and down the stairs, using it, recycling it, it’s 
definitely been a different experience. We had to move our toothbrushes 
out of the bathroom because it’s like a reflex, you just grab it and go, and 
I don’t want the kids to do it, says Shayne. 
He also told me very openly and honestly about all the negative feelings he has 
as he is trying to take care of his kids in the best possible way under the given 
circumstances: 
I’ve had to be proactive as a parent, making sure they have fluoride in 
their water and all these things. It’s not just the bottled water, we have to 
be careful. That’s the hardest part, being a parent. And the fear, you 
know I’m scared to death that because of where I chose to live, is going 
to affect their entire future. It sucks. 
Listening to Shayne made me feel deeply saddened. He is afraid of 
unintentionally harming his children’s health because he once moved to Flint 
and never anticipated something like the water crisis happening. From speaking 
with him I understood that he feels vulnerable as he has been subjected to 
something he or his family did not want or deserve. Despite his difficult situation, 
he still tries to live his life and be an active member of the community, and he 
tells me for example about his political aspirations. In chapter 4 I discuss 
vulnerability caused by the state and the relations between the state and Flint 
citizens. I can only imagine that Shayne’s feelings reflect those of so many 
others living in the city. Dewaun has similar experiences with his kids and the 
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challenging task of having to tell them what is going on in order to keep them 
safe. Here I am quoting him at length: 
I have two children myself [at the time of the interview seven and nine 
years]. First time I took them to lead testing, it was just a real shock, right. 
My daughter would just cry, and I was just so pissed off. These kids have 
no idea what’s going on, very innocent, they been subjected to this and I 
had to be the one to break it to them and tell what the deal is. I watched 
them wash with bottled water and they looked at me like “What’s going 
on with the water?” And that’s a real conversation that has to be had. 
I talked to them, we boil our water before we bathe and of course we 
have a full-house filtration system. I told them why we have this. Really 
want them to know that this is what we went through at this point of time, 
see it all, what it is. 
Dewaun tells me that the mother of the children lives in another city in Michigan 
and the kids are used to living in two homes with two very different ways of 
using water: “They know like ‘When we go to dad’s house we gotta boil the 
water, we gotta get bottled water to brush our teeth, we can’t drink the water, we 
can’t put in on our face, when we bathe it’s in and out’, you know what I’m 
saying.” 
The above presented experiences of my informants help to construct an idea of 
what the everyday state-citizen interaction looks like in Flint. Having to go to 
state-maintained PODs, getting told the water is fine although it looks and 
smells odd, letting the GM plant switch water sources but not the city 
residents… The examples are many. In the following chapters I will explain how 
these mundane examples affect how the residents perceive the state as an 
actor. The people I met were divided about their confidence in the future of Flint: 
Some thought that the city will be able to rise back to its feet thanks to the 
efforts by the residents, whereas others, especially the people who were hit the 
hardest, expressed very dark visions about the future. Only time will tell how 
things turn out, but the aftermath of the crisis is still far from over. 
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3.3 Water crisis as a disaster 
 
“Nothing that has been uncovered to date suggests that anyone intended to 
poison the people of Flint. Nor is there presently any evidence that anybody 
considered elevated lead levels to be acceptable because Flint is a city primarily 
made up of people of color.” This conclusion is suggested by the Michigan Civil 
Rights Commission Report on the water crisis in February 2017. The question of 
whether the lead poisoning of Flint was intentional or not, has been under 
debate since the crisis’ beginning.  
 
In this subchapter I will answer the question of why the locals think the water 
crisis might have been an intentional act from the state, a poisoning of the city. 
Their answers strongly focus on the theme of injustice, connected to the place 
they are living in, their skin color and their economic status. I propose a 
perspective to the Flint crisis that combines anthropological disaster studies with 
the fact that the water crisis was deliberately man-made, as opposed to a 
natural disaster striking out of nowhere. 
 
The lead crisis has been framed alternately in the media as either a 
contamination or as a deliberate poisoning of Flint residents. This dichotomy 
became clear during my fieldwork as well. Some people believed that the state 
officials did not anticipate the magnitude of the consequences, but most of the 
people I spoke with felt that the role of the state officials was more active than 
just misunderstanding and forgetting. A few were downright confident that the 
officials tried to deliberately poison the 100 000 city residents. I want to stress 
here that I do not wish to take a personal stance on this in my thesis, but rather 
just reiterate the thoughts of my informants and what has been written about the 
case in the media.  
 
39 
 
For example, Tru, a Flint born and raised woman with a loud voice and strong 
opinions, believed that the water crisis was "a set-up", something that was 
planned and purposely done to the residents. Robert, a man in his sixties, 
compared the water crisis to some racist events in the past, like the police 
shooting the young, black man Michael Brown in 2014, or experiments like 
Tuskegee, a syphilis-study conducted on African American men. The 
experiment, which started in the 1930s, eventually lead to severe health 
problems and even deaths for some 400 men (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, accessed 5.2.2019). 
 
We discussed Flint’s bad reputation with Tru and her friend Beth at a local 
café/book shop. I asked Tru why she believes that Flint was chosen as the 
target of a set-up poisoning of this kind. She answered me as follows: 
Flint has always been a poor city. Shops were pulled out, I believe what’s 
going on now was started back then. They caused Flint to be poor. More 
of a black population. These years of talking Flint being number one 
murder cap, I believe that caused people to say “Well, they just a bunch 
of murderers and prostitutes, who cares”. Flint was not number one 
murder cap! [raising her voice] We did not have as many murders as they 
said. That was just to cause people to turn their head from Flint, to 
prepare for what they were going to do. 
What is apparent in Tru’s comment is the strong belief in that the officials and 
decision-makers undervalued Flint as a city because of its demographics (poor 
and black) and reputation (murder capital). According to Tru, “they” also 
deliberately framed Flint as a murderous place in order to make it look bad and 
worthless, thus justifying what was done about the water.  
 
I wanted to know more about what people think about the possible racial 
aspects behind the crisis, so I contacted a local positive news media, Unity 
News. Unity consists of three men, all people of color, and after a few messages 
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on Facebook I was invited to their office in the northern part of the city. They 
seemed impressed with my task to come all the way from Finland to try to 
understand the water crisis, and they even asked me if they could record my 
interview with them and show it on their social media platforms. A little bit 
nervous, but delighted, I agreed. 
We all sat down for a chat and I asked them about their experiences with the 
crisis and environmental racism associated with it. Cameron, dressed in a grey 
hoodie and glasses, brought up something that had been repeatedly stated both 
by my informants and by the media, namely that other cities in Michigan, white 
and better-off cities, do not and most likely will not ever have similar problems. 
Cameron thought that race played a part in the decisions made and continued 
by saying that: “I can kinda say they would intentionally do it, because we know 
not to use the water, GM was here, so it was a lot of toxic waste in the water in 
the first place. I feel like that was kinda for them to save money and cut costs, it 
was like we wasn’t a priority. That’s how I feel about it.” Jermaine, holding a 
video camera a few meters from us, nodded his head in agreement and named 
Grand Blanc and Battle Creek as examples of Michigan cities (both over 70 % 
white) that would not have been subjected to a similar kind of action. 
Social scientist Laura Pulido is one of those researchers who believe that the 
city was poisoned on purpose. According to her, as the economic capital 
abandoned Flint a long time ago, it became an increasingly poor place with a 
black majority. This in turn justified the state to abandon it as well, something 
that came to be seen as shrinking investment in services and infrastructure and 
decreasing democratic practice. In her paper she uses the word “poisoning” 
deliberately, as she believes that words like “contamination” erase agency and 
consciousness, whereas poisoning suggests a deliberate and evil act. Like my 
informant Robert, Pulido compares the situation to other assaults on people of 
color. She mentions Tuskegee, as well as uranium mining on Navajo land, and 
the sterilization of Latina women in the 1960-70s (Pulido 2016, p. 2). 
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Heather’s opinion, I believe, is strongly influenced by her academic background 
in the social sciences. “I actually hate calling it a water crisis, I don’t think it’s a 
water crisis”, she said. “It’s a crisis of democracy, of racism and classism. It’s a 
crisis of access to clean water.” She agreed with me when I said that I have 
heard some people call it a humanitarian crisis and she believed that the 
situation was not an accident, but a purpose fall. Heather’s remark about what 
kind of crisis the situation should be called, brings up an important point: The 
words and discourse used can frame the case very differently. I quote the 
MCRC’s report again: 
 
The Civil Rights Commission will continue to use the word crisis to define 
the events in Flint. While the definition may not be exactly correct, the 
term has the benefit of having become a commonly used and recognized 
way of referencing the harm that befell the people of Flint. More 
important, when disasters and declared states of disaster occur, they are 
cleaned up and declared over. Declaring an end to a disaster may be 
appropriate for events that result from outside forces, though many of the 
people affected may still be dealing with the “disaster” for some time 
thereafter. Government, however, caused this crisis and therefore 
government should not see this as a disaster that can be followed by a 
short period of recovery and then ended (Michigan Civil Rights 
Commission 2017). 
 
Disasters are defined in anthropology as processes that combine a destructive 
agent from the natural or built environment with a population in a socially or 
economically vulnerable condition. The result is a disruption to the everyday life 
and individual and social needs for survival. Disasters do not happen in a 
vacuum, but they are always multidimensional, historical processes which 
involve multiple subjectivities (Hoffman & Oliver-Smith 2002, p. 4). 
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“Coherence and contradiction, cooperation and conflict, hegemony and 
resistance, as they are expressed through the operation of physical, biological, 
and social systems and behavioral practices, become manifest” in disasters as 
they challenge the society holistically (Hoffman & Oliver-Smith 2002, p. 7). 
Disasters also disclose linkages and relations between the local community and 
the larger structures, such as the state and nation. How these relationships work 
is manifested in stressful conditions in ways that are not evident under normal 
conditions in everyday life. According to Hoffman and Oliver-Smith, the actions 
and performance of certain state-level organizations can trigger a change in the 
relations of communities and the larger society (ibid. p. 10). 
 
In many cases modern disasters are indicators of institutions failing to live up to 
their expectations and missions (Hoffman & Oliver-Smith 2002). “…The 
increase in technological disasters, and in particular those with lasting toxic 
impact, has an undeniable human agency and is seen by some to endanger 
faith in human institutions, placing doubt or calling into question the validity of 
culture itself” (ibid. p. 46). All of the descriptions above are applicable to the Flint 
crisis in a very straightforward manner. The water crisis might at first seem as 
something happening out of nowhere, but as my thesis strives to demonstrate, 
there were indeed decades of economical abandonment and state 
mismanagement behind the lead poisoning. The water disaster brought forth the 
power structures between the local residents and the state, causing the locals to 
feel worthless and undeserving of protection. Like my informants’ comments 
demonstrate, the assumption was that the state’s job is to protect its citizens, 
but as the details of the crisis were revealed, the people lost trust in protection 
from the state.  
 
One of the reasons for looking at the Flint water crisis from a disaster 
perspective is because anthropological disaster research emphasizes how 
disasters are always grounded in history. Like Roberto Barrios puts it: 
“Anthropological definitions of disaster, in contrast, understand catastrophes as 
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the end result of historical processes by which human practices enhance the 
materially destructive and socially disruptive capacities of geophysical 
phenomena, technological malfunctions, and communicable diseases and 
inequitably distribute disaster risk according to lines of gender, race, class, and 
ethnicity” (Barrios 2017, p. 151). 
 
Anthropologist Peter Little writes about technological disaster in Endicott, a 
small town in western New York, the birthplace of the technological giant IBM. 
Endicott residents have for decades lived with high-tech pollution from the plant 
and witnessed a chemical spill from the plant in 1979 which contained a soup of 
different chemicals. The town is now going through one of the country’s largest 
mitigation efforts (Little 2014). Just like Flint, Endicott is seen by the residents as 
a place where it all once started (high-tech in Endicott, automobile industry in 
Flint), and a place that is today poor and deindustrialized, another troubled Rust 
Belt city.  
 
The similarities between the comments of Endicott and Flint residents are 
striking. Many of the residents Little spoke with let him know that the TCE 
contamination is “just another sign” of the town falling apart and becoming one 
of the many cities that are left decaying after a long period of industrial 
dynamism (Little 2014, p. 63). These views as well as the feeling of an overall 
decline in the quality of life, both echo the same themes and feelings as the 
people in Flint have. Endicott residents shared similar concerns over their health 
and the toxins affecting it, not knowing for sure where the many cancers and 
other illnesses were coming from and hearing conflicting information from public 
health officials. Also, their views of the working of the state and its officials could 
almost be from my own fieldwork.  
 
A quote from one of Little’s informants, “Larry”, sums it up quite well: “I think the 
state probably didn’t really pay close attention to us for a long time. I mean, if it 
had happened in a nicer place, they might have done more to clean it up early 
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on. But they sat on the whole problem for 25 years, maybe with the effect that 
people would not give too much voice to it. The community found their voice” 
(Little 2014, p. 163). 
 
In the case of Flint, the neglect of the city’s infrastructure and the misuse of 
corrosion control ultimately led to the large-scale poisoning. But as I have 
strived to make clear throughout my thesis, the roots of the situation can be 
traced decades back in history. During my fieldwork, everyone I spoke with 
brought up the rich history of Flint (which I have explained more in detail in 
chapter 1.2), in one way or another. People often referred to the city as the 
historic middle-class automobile town, the industrial heart of the Midwest, if not 
the whole United States. 
 
As I have argued above, the situation in Flint should be considered as a 
culmination of the long history of deliberate mismanagement and abandonment, 
not just as a one-time accident. Although the source of the lead poisoning was a 
natural element, water, the crisis cannot be seen as natural, but historically 
man-made. Therefore, I propose that the anthropology of disasters should focus 
more on man-made catastrophes and their connections to the local history and 
population. 
 
The issue with the Flint crisis, whether we call it a crisis, a disaster, a 
catastrophe or something else, is that it is still not over and will not be over in a 
long time in the future. Even if all the pipes were changed and the water proved 
to be completely safe, the people still remember the loss of trust and feelings of 
injustice. I was talking with George about this, how different crises are quickly 
forgotten about as the society’s memory span seems to be very short. George 
criticized the fact that the state officials did not act appropriately, but instead 
dismissed the problems they had caused:  
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When this water situation is done, what happens to the people? ‘Oh, 
everything’s perfect!’ No, it’s not, your thought process just goes to 
something else. Shootings, hurricanes in Puerto Rico… 
Those things are travesties, but most of those are natural disasters, or 
controllable through actions of congress. Gun control, you can make a 
decision and change the effect almost immediately. A fire, you can only 
do what you can do. But when you have something, like, okay, I 
purposely put a bug on your shirt to make you go crazy, then you have to 
figure out how do we change this, not just ‘Okay, she’s just hysterical’, 
but why is he putting the bug on her to make her hysterical. And why 
aren’t ya’ll concerned enough to help her? 
 
After what I think is a good metaphor for describing the situation between Flint 
residents and the purposeful actions of the state, we both sit silent for a 
moment. I hear the blaring of sirens in the distance, getting progressively louder 
until an ambulance swooshes past the house. I cannot help thinking that the 
sirens, a sound for emergency, and the situation of Flint residents are 
connected.  
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4 The state and its citizens in the water crisis 
 
4.1 The state: producing vulnerable subjects 
 
Below is a snippet from my field diary when I attended a public hearing called 
“Lead and Copper Rule Community Meeting”, organized by Flint Rising, a local 
coalition of community organizations and probably one of the most visible ones 
in Flint. In addition to this event, I participated in several others which all made it 
very tangible to me how real and holistic the suffering of the residents was. 
 
We are sitting in an auditorium, in a Mott Community College building 
some kilometers from downtown. The small number of attendees 
surprises me, there are only some 30 people present, in addition to the 
few organizers and a man with a video camera and headphones in the 
front row (probably a local reporter). A young girl, approximately 12 years 
old with braided hair, hands out water bottles to all the participants. After 
a quick introduction into the Lead and Copper Rule and some 
practicalities, the audience gets the opportunity to share their views and 
experiences.  
 
A black-haired woman from the back row stands up from her seat slowly, 
it looks like she has a lot of trouble moving. To someone wondering why 
so few people are present that day, she answers by saying that “So many 
people are sick, they have a hard time to even get out of their 
houses...That’s why.” People around me nod their heads in agreement. 
She then continues by saying that she is 37 years old, but physically she 
feels like 90. With shaking hands, she lifts up a big, plastic box to the 
table and starts pulling out different packages of medicines, showing the 
audience everything she and her son (born with a medical condition) 
have to take daily. She blames the government for thinking that people in 
Flint are like sheep who can be treated in any way the officials want. “I 
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pray for every person in this city, every day”, she concludes and slowly 
sinks back into her seat. I feel downright depressed, like a big clump has 
formed in my throat and is sinking down to my stomach. (Field diary, 
22.02.2018) 
 
At the event in question, as well as few others, I came to realize that the 
question troubling many of the residents in Flint (and me as well) was “Why are 
so few participating in taking action and holding the decision makers 
accountable?” Another example was when one day, Carroll called me and 
asked if I would be interested in coming with her to meet some other people in 
order to plan a peaceful protest in the city. I agreed and so we sat down at a 
local restaurant together with Tru, who had initiated the meeting. However, after 
waiting for a good while, we came to the realization that no one else would 
arrive, despite that about ten other people had expressed their interest toward 
the meeting on Facebook. We were disappointed but started planning the 
protest regardless, while sipping on our coffees.  
 
These two concrete examples from my fieldwork show how the people of Flint 
were trying to influence the ones in power, organizing, protesting and actively 
demanding action, all this despite many of them being economically struggling 
and sickened by the toxins. In this chapter, I answer my first research question: 
“How do the residents of Flint perceive the state during the water crisis?” I 
propose that people see the state as separate from them, as a force outside of 
the society that is being unjust toward the residents and producing vulnerability. 
Yet the people also understand the state to be fragmented and not consisting of 
one single force but a multitude of different actors who all played a part in the 
crisis.  
 
Theoretically, I analyze the complex state/society relations through the lens of 
citizenship, vulnerability and state processes. After the residents witnessed the 
state trying to silence them, neglecting their demands about clean water and 
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taking a long time to act to relieve the situation, the state came to be seen as an 
antihero. The crisis made people lose trust in the state and see themselves as 
disregarded and living under vulnerable conditions in a declined city yet trying to 
be active citizens. Before my analysis, I will provide a brief summary of some 
theories of citizenship and vulnerability as they are linked to the Flint case. Both 
concepts are intrinsic aspects of examining the relationship between the 
residents and the state. According to a prominent view in social sciences, 
citizenship as a status is formed and transformed in everyday interactions 
between the state and its citizens. Studies of citizenship might bring out the 
complex and complicated relationships between people and the state and its 
bureaucracy, as the case of Flint clearly demonstrates.  
 
One day, I was having a chat with Tru and her friend Beth. Beth tells me that 
she has been living in the city since 1996 and that her husband used to work for 
GM, but now he just gets occasional small jobs. “We just survive”, she says. We 
discuss Michigan’s emergency management law (which I delve into in the next 
chapter) and its undemocratic nature. She tells me that she got the enthusiasm 
to participate in democratic decision-making from her mother, who never missed 
an election. Beth has done the same all her life (“And I’ve been around for a 
long time”, she laughs), but now she says that for the first time in her life she 
feels like her vote does not count, referring to the phrase many young people 
use as an argument for not voting. 
 
“I literally felt my vote didn’t count, because the people I elected were not 
allowed to do what they were elected for”, she tells me, meaning that the 
emergency manager overruled the city council and its chosen representatives, 
which in turn lead to cost-cutting decisions, like the infamous water switch. 
Beth’s disappointed comment demonstrates clearly the interconnection between 
citizenship and democratic decision making, both important aspects relating to 
the water crisis as well.  
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“For a strong and well-functioning democracy, the argument goes, ordinary 
people should be willing and able to participate in the decision-making process 
that affects their lives as rights-bearing citizens”, writes Takeshi Ito. Citizenship 
can be seen as a relational process which is shaped by and transforming 
mundane state - citizen interactions. Ito argues for an approach for studying 
citizenship that brings into focus the everyday interactions, instead of just the 
rights and duties of citizens. In practice, though, many groups, such as 
minorities, women and poor people do not always get to enjoy the full rights of 
citizenship (Ito 2017, p. 51). The inequality between groups of people is 
significant in the case of Flint, as the city is filled with economically struggling 
people and people of color. Many of the people I spoke with said that the state 
officials are not concerned enough about Flint to help the city, because for them 
poor and black people are not as deserving as people in wealthier suburbs in 
Michigan. 
 
Anthropology of citizenship as a theoretical frame often overlaps with 
anthropology of democracy, yet it is not subsection of it, as citizenship exists in 
non-democratic societies as well, reminds Lazar (2013). Citizenship, according 
to him, is used to evoke virtues: Equal rights, engagement between societal 
actors and citizens and aspects of political participation, such as the right to vote 
and the right to be elected. Sociologist T.H. Marshall’s definition of citizenship in 
1950 still is at the heart of many contemporary anthropological theories of the 
topic. He defined it as follows: “Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who 
are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with 
respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed” (Marshall 
1983 [1950] cited in Lazar 2013, p. 1). 
 
The similarities between studies of democracy and citizenship become clear 
especially in the ethnographic way of conducting research and its analytic 
openness. Neither the study of democracy nor the study of citizenship take a 
certain, normative definition as a starting point, but rather allow it to emerge 
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through encounters with the people in focus (Paley 2008, cited in Lazar 2013, p. 
19). ”Like anthropology of citizenship, anthropology of democracy explores the 
meanings, practices and languages of political action, as well as the interplay 
between formal and informal political spaces in specific contexts”, writes Lazar 
(2013, p. 19). 
 
In anthropological theory, citizenship is considered to be related to the state, yet 
not only to the community of the nation-state. The scale of the political 
community should always be kept in mind: Besides the state, it can be the city 
or even the global world of today. In analyzing citizenship ethnographically, the 
location of where different practices of citizenship actually take place is 
important. In urban settings, these are often public spheres such as 
demonstrating on the streets, but also various forms of associational activities, 
where citizens build, negotiate and define the society and sometimes even meet 
each other violently (Lazar 2016).  
 
One way of analyzing citizenship has been a Foucauldian approach that takes 
into focus how entities like states make citizens under different regimes. States 
create citizens through legal, ideological and bureaucratic frameworks that 
affect practices of political participation and government. One of the most 
prominent examples of citizen-creating by the state is schooling or education, as 
national schooling systems are important aspects in the development of a 
national identity. A popular interpretation of citizenship understands it in terms of 
the realization of rights. In this view, citizenship “refers to a relationship between 
a person and a political community, characterized by mutual rights and 
obligations, and activated by the role this person plays in the political life of that 
community. This relationship is ideally enshrined in law, defining the basic rights 
of the citizen concerning property, identity, security and welfare and protecting 
individual citizens against the state as well as against fellow citizens” 
(Berenschot, Nordholt & Bakker 2017, p. 4-5).  
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According to Berenschot et al. (2017), it is possible to distinguish three traditions 
of inquiry of citizenship in social sciences. The first, the liberal version of 
citizenship has its roots in the 18th century, when individual rights and freedom 
were first granted for the elite, and then during the following centuries slowly 
also middle and lower classes were allowed to participate in social democracy. 
Thus, the liberal version supports a view of citizenship as a gradually formed 
relationship between individuals and the state institutions (Berenschot et al., p. 
5).  
 
The second tradition understands citizenship as a desirable activity rather than 
a legal status. This republican tradition emphasizes people as capable and 
willing to take responsibility for their political affairs, thus granting them 
citizenship as political beings. Traditionally, in the republican view, the state’s 
excessive interference in matters of civil society had to be avoided. This view, 
however, came to be questioned when neoliberalism gained foothold and 
advocated instead for “less state, more market”. Lastly, the communitarian 
tradition emerged in reaction to the previous ones, focusing on matters of 
identity and saw citizenship as a way of relating to a larger political community. 
Despite slight differences, all three interpretations still share the view of 
citizenship being a vital aspect of democracy (Berenschot et al., p. 5-6).  
 
An active citizenry relies on aspects such as trust, tolerance and associational 
activity and the capability and will to hold decision makers accountable. A 
certain tradition of academic literature, which my thesis contributes to as well, 
focuses on citizenship as rights-based collective action where groups publicly 
express their demands to the state for obtaining full or expanded rights. The 
actions of the citizens are important in achieving democratic accountability 
(Berenschot et al., p.7). As has been emphasized throughout my thesis, the 
Flint residents are active citizens who, despite being under very vulnerable 
conditions, tried to make their voices and demands heard and finally succeeded 
in it. They wanted to hold the officials accountable, yet slowly lost trust in them 
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as they did not respond in a way the residents would have wanted. Here I want 
to quickly consider the topic of vulnerability, closely linked to citizenship. 
Vulnerability in this case is not just a quality inherent to the people of Flint, but 
something produced by decades of the state’s actions of neglect and austerity 
policies. 
 
Lenwood is an assistant professor at the University of Michigan-Flint as well as 
a part of the evaluation team for Flint ReCAST. ReCAST is grant-funded 
committee that focuses on supporting collaborative efforts to enhance resiliency, 
mental health and wellness for Flint community members. I met Lenwood at a 
local Resiliency Summit event I attended, organized by the Genesee County, 
City of Flint and Flint ReCAST. After the event, as I was putting on my coat and 
about to exit the building, a woman approximately my age approached me and 
asked if I would like to discuss the event and give feedback on it. I hesitated, but 
as I am terrible at saying no, finally agreed to follow her to a room with a few 
other participants as well. Lenwood was one of the organizers and therefore 
also one of the facilitators. After the feedback session I introduced myself and 
asked Lenwood and some other people for their contacts. 
Later as we met with Lenwood, he told me about two women who attend his 
class of public health studies. Both women are mothers and work full-time, in 
addition to finishing their master’s degrees. Lenwood told me that he is very 
proud of those students as they are trying their best to positively influence the 
futures of their children, despite the situation in their hometown and the 
additional stress caused by it.  
“They even take their children to class occasionally. Being able to see that, that 
they will still come to class, because not coming to class isn’t an option. To me, 
that’s resiliency, that’s agency, growth, a narrative that needs to be talked about 
more. Especially in contradiction to the narrative of this “poor victim”, says 
Lenwood.  
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What Lenwood talks about in other words is vulnerability, a concept that has 
been important in social sciences as it has helped to analyze the role that 
humans play in producing risks and hazards as opposed to them being 
“natural”. Vulnerability can at its simplest be defined as an indicator of the 
unequal distribution of hazards and a group’s or individual’s ability to cope with 
and recover from a disaster. The temporal aspect of vulnerability emphasizes 
the fact that for many people around the world, life is chronically insecure. 
Temporality also means that as human behavior lies at the root of vulnerability, 
then it must be historically produced. Thus, the background for a disaster begins 
long before the immediate catastrophic event, as well as continues even after 
the situation subsides (Faas 2016, p. 14). 
 
The concept of vulnerability emerged in anthropology in the 1970s and it came 
to replace the concept of the “savage” with the “suffering subject”, which evoked 
empathy rather than otherness. Vulnerability still has its uses, but over the 
decades it has been critiqued for assuming that disaster-affected populations 
are poor victims without power and agency. As Faas summarizes: “— — people 
do consciously engage with political, economic, and hazard vulnerabilities; the 
vulnerable are not passive bodies on whom labels of vulnerability are imposed, 
but rather actively engage in the discursive framing of their practices and 
conditions” (Faas 2016, p. 20). 
 
Lenwood highlights on several occasions this active agent vs. passive victim 
dichotomy. He says that he is passionate about helping people to see that 
survival does not have to be their only option in the traumatic situation. Instead, 
he wants to go beyond survival and help people to accept the idea of “thriving”. 
As I have demonstrated throughout my thesis, following contemporary theories 
of vulnerability in anthropology, it is crucial to keep in mind that the Flint 
residents should not be seen as passive victims in the water crisis.  
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On the contrary, the active efforts and continuous mobilizing6 of the locals were 
the reason that the water issue was finally taken seriously by the officials, even 
if it did take a shamefully long time for the state to admit that they had failed. 
Disaster cases like Flint are unfortunate but appropriate examples of everyday 
vulnerability as an anthropological object of research. Like the temporality of 
vulnerability makes us understand, people of Flint have for decades lived in 
precarious conditions produced by the state, where the water crisis was just a 
happenstance that finally made the city’s conditions visible for the world. 
 
4.2 Dispersed and separate from society 
 
When discussing the state and its significance for the water crisis, it is important 
to define precisely what I mean by “the state”. Most of my informants who used 
the exact word did not point out that they meant the state of Michigan per se 
(versus the federal republic), yet it was implicitly expressed in their views. In 
Finnish, there are separate words for the federal republic as a state (“valtio”) 
and the state as a smaller entity, of which there are 50 in the U.S. (“osavaltio”). 
In English, however, such a distinction does not exist. Therefore, when I use the 
word state in my thesis, I am referring to the state of Michigan as an actor. I am 
emphasizing this because as it will be clear later in my thesis, “the state” is not a 
coherent entity, but a cluster of different actors, and therefore it is important to 
distinguish the different levels of “the state” from each other. 
 
What became clear to me during my fieldwork, was that the people in Flint 
blamed different parts of the state for the water crisis. My informants mentioned 
for example “they”, “the officials”, “the state”, “the governor”, “the government”, 
“the ones in power”, “the MDEQ”, “public health officials” and “the emergency 
manager law”. Yet, even those who told me, for instance, that the emergency 
manager is the person behind the crisis, understood that the different parts are 
                                                          
6 For anyone interested in the activism part of the Flint crisis, I recommend the book “Flint Fights 
Back” (forthcoming) by Benjamin Pauli, a local social scientist from Kettering University who I 
got to know during my stay. 
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all intertwined with each other, as the emergency manager was appointed by 
the governor, the governor represents the whole state, and so forth. My 
informant Kay summarized my findings quite well: “I don’t think there’s one 
person. There’s a perfect storm of systems that were put together that didn’t 
have the right checks and balances. In a climate where financial issues are put 
ahead of people’s issues… There are many people that could’ve done things 
differently. “ 
 
Tru held some strong opinions about the situation. “Now the people don’t hold 
the power, the government do. When the government and the constitution is 
built for the people, the people are the ones that’s supposed to be in control, not 
the government. The government work for the people, but now… [clicks tongue] 
The people work for the government. By force”, she said. Mirroring this quote to 
my whole conversation with Tru and all the other personal encounters I had in 
Flint, it is possible to realize how the residents see themselves as separate from 
the state (for instance, using pronouns like “they” and “we”).  
 
Although this state-society dichotomy has been criticized and rejected in 
contemporary anthropology (e.g. Krohn-Hansen & Nustad 2005), I am here 
calling for a focus on examining why the dichotomy is still expressed in the 
everyday language and lives of certain groups of people, like the residents of 
Flint. Like mentioned already in the theory chapter, I argue that some processes 
and everyday practices of the state enable such a separation. In the case of 
Flint, these practices were for instance downplaying the concerns of the 
residents, refusing to switch back to the old water source and placing financial 
interests above everything else. All this eventually created a feeling for the 
residents of being neglected by and separated from the state.  
 
An observation that is crucial in the case of Flint is how there were several 
different actors and institutions that played a part in the water crisis. The media 
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discourse has claimed that “the state failed its residents” and has thus been 
reproducing a view of the state as a unified ensemble, when in fact, some parts 
of the state actually worked to prevent the water crisis from happening. To give 
an example: Miguel Del Toral, a manager at the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), began voluntarily looking into the water issues and doing 
additional testing in 2015 after a Flint resident contacted him and other experts. 
Del Toral wrote a long report about the high lead levels and stated that the city 
had not treated its water with corrosion control chemicals since the water switch 
— a precaution which is required by the law to keep the river water safe and 
drinkable. Additionally, the report revealed how the city of Flint was conducting 
the water testing incorrectly, most likely in order to get the results to show as 
low lead levels as possible (Clark 2018). According to Tru and Beth who I talked 
with, the city had told the residents to run the water for several minutes before 
taking a test sample. (“Please, that ain’t no fresh test!” Beth exclaimed) Tru 
stressed that she did not trust the testing conducted by the officials because of 
how long they had taken to admit that there were TTHMs in the water. In 
addition to Del Toral, there have been other independent researchers and 
employees of the state that have had conflicting views. This raises the question 
of whose knowledge matters in the end, something I will discuss further. 
 
Examples like this illustrate well the complex role of the state and its different 
entities, where some of them hold conflicting views and which might ultimately 
result in disastrous situations. The MDEQ had stated that there was no need to 
add corrosion control to the water at the treatment plant. Even after the federal 
EPA told the state that Flint must begin corrosion control immediately, the state 
refused to act, claiming that they needed to monitor the water first for a longer 
time before changing its treatment. Later, the explanation given by the MDEQ 
was that they had misunderstood the Lead and Copper Rule and therefore left 
out the corrosion control treatment. My informant Heather expressed her 
concerns about the state institutions’ conflicting views, saying that “The 
Department of Environmental Quality, and the EPA and all of these institutions 
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exist in part to be sure that these things don’t happen… Except it seems like 
they actually facilitated it in this case.” 
 
Akhil Gupta, studying structural violence and poverty in India, warns us about 
perceiving the state as a unified entity, instead of trying to decentralize it and 
see it as fragmented into smaller parts:  
 
One of the most striking aspects about references typically made to the 
state, apart from its purposive nature, is the unitary character of the 
object being described. The state supposedly decides this and does that; 
the state speaks with one voice, often the voice of the leader; the state 
stands for the general good; the state represents the collective interests 
over those of individual ones, and so forth (Gupta 2012, p. 44). 
 
According to Gupta, most analyses of the state reinforce its unitary qualities, 
even though they criticize its power. The state is described as a dominating or 
repressive force, and it can be criticized for example for not caring about the 
poor and not regulating systems of capitalism that result in pollution and 
inequality. However, people with very different perspectives might still view the 
state as a cohesive entity. The state should thus be seen as dispersed into 
smaller parts, and being pulled in different directions by various levels, rather 
than being an organization acting unanimously with one specific intention 
(Gupta, p. 46). Following this argument, I am focusing on presenting the state of 
Michigan in my thesis as consisting of smaller parts which all affected the 
unfolding of the crisis.  
 
Gupta highlights that an ethnographic focus on the state might help bring forth 
the diverse levels of the state. A distinction often made in modern nation-states 
differentiates between the legislative, judicial and administrative functions of the 
state. It is equally important to think about the location of the state: What is the 
relationship between the federal level, the regional states, counties, 
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municipalities, villages and so forth. All three functions mentioned above might 
be present at each level (Gupta 2012, p. 46). According to him, in research, all 
claims about the state should start with answering the question of “Which 
state?” and whatever the claim might be, asking whether it is true for all levels 
and functions of the state or just those that are being studied (ibid., p. 52). 
Therefore, I have explicitly stated earlier in my thesis that I focus on the state of 
Michigan, as opposed to the federal state. Some headlines about the water 
crisis have falsely stated that the city of Flint would have caused the situation, 
as for example The Guardian wrote in July 2018. I am not denying that some of 
the city-level officials could have done their job better, but in the end, it was the 
state of Michigan that made the relevant decisions and therefore also carries 
most of the blame from the residents. 
 
Gupta also writes about the different agencies of the state and their mutual 
relations. Often there are separate departments or bureaus serving different 
purposes, for example education, defense, medical care and housing. Gupta 
then connects these different departments/bureaus (he calls them “portfolios”) to 
the spatial and decision-making levels of the state, creating a picture of 
intertwined parts:  
 
If one imagines a three-dimensional grid, each of these portfolios may be 
subject to legislative, judicial and administrative action, and each may be 
found at federal, state, and local levels. — — What emerges from this 
depiction of the state is a highly complex array of institutions with multiple 
functional specializations, modes of operation, levels and agendas 
(Gupta 2012, p. 46). 
 
There will probably never be a certain way of knowing why the MDEQ opted to 
leave out the corrosion control chemicals despite the request from the EPA, but 
there has been discussion about how it might relate to the state’s financial 
situation. Although the total funding for the MDEQ has increased in the last ten 
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years, the two subsections most closely related to drinking water quality faced 
notable cuts between 2006 and 2016. Records show that the total staffing of the 
MDEQ was slashed 22 percent during that time period. The cuts were made 
despite that fact that the department has one of the largest numbers of 
community water systems to regulate (Clark 2018, p. 161). My informant 
Rebecca told me that she thinks it all comes down to politics and to the state 
that keeps disinvesting in its departments, which in turn leads to weakened 
protection for the citizens. According to her, “People don’t want regulations until 
the regulations are the things that keep them safe.” To her the reason the state 
is not protecting the residents is the fact that not enough has been invested in 
the agencies.  
 
Gupta raises the question of intention in relation to examining structural violence 
against the poor, which his studies have mainly focused on. To quote Gupta: 
  
This is why intention is a poor place to start in thinking about state 
violence toward the poor. The state is an incoherent agent for the kind of 
violence I focus on, and even the vocabulary of indifference raises the 
ghostly specter of an agent who exercises that indifference. Indifference 
does not need to be intentionally caused by a particular agent. A 
disaggregated view of the state makes it possible to open up the black 
box of unintended outcomes by showing how they are systematically 
produced by the friction between agendas, bureaus, levels, and spaces 
that make up the state (Gupta 2012, p. 46-47, emphasis added).  
 
Such a viewpoint offers one possible answer to the question of whether the 
water crisis of Flint was a deliberate poisoning or not, something addressed in 
the previous chapter more specifically. 
 
The whole situation in Flint invokes the question of Whose knowledge matters? 
Who gets to say the last word, the officials or the citizens? For several months 
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after the first signs of something being wrong with the water emerged, the state 
officials kept discrediting the citizen-science based information the residents had 
gathered. Many people showed up at protests around the city (especially at the 
City Hall building), holding up banners and bottles of discolored water they had 
filled from their own taps. Kay and I talked about the many conflicts there have 
been in the city and according to her, the conflicts have been mostly between 
officials and the residents, as people have been so thoroughly desperate to 
make their voices heard.   
 
Kay referred to one of the classes held at the University of Michigan-Flint, where 
they organized a whole course on the water crisis in 2016.  
 
One of the classes, as soon as one person would start talking, he was 
from the state, you’d hear all this crinkling and you couldn’t hear him, it 
was so overwhelming. People had planned so that they would take their 
water bottles and go like…you know, this [shows a squeezing gesture 
with her hand] so that every time he opened his mouth, you couldn’t hear 
what he said. Which kinda told a story of ‘There’s nothing you can say 
that we’d believe.’ 
 
Kay expressed some sympathy towards the official, saying that she felt it was 
somewhat unfair, as he had not even opened his mouth yet. What became clear 
to her was that it is not important what someone says, but who says it, whether 
people trust the source of the information or not. “If it comes from a mouth that’s 
not trusted, it’s useless”, she summarized.   
 
The evidence amassed by independent researchers (like Del Toral, mentioned 
above) and the experiences of city residents were met with discrediting for 
months before the state at last admitted its mistakes. Mona Hanna-Attisha, a 
local pediatric health professional, who I had the privilege of personally meeting 
during my last weeks in Flint, is one of the people whose knowledge was at first 
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dismissed. She published her study on elevated lead levels in children’s blood in 
2015, claiming that the levels had nearly doubled since the water switch. The 
MDEQ first contradicted her findings, until after some time the officials finally 
believed her and apologized. Hanna-Attisha told me that many of the Flint 
activists in the forefront were female, often stay-at-home moms who took the 
time out of their daily lives to campaign for safe water. As discussed in the 
previous subchapter, the active citizens of the city were the reason that the state 
finally admitted its mistakes and started the remediation efforts. 
 
Like the mentioned examples from Hanna-Attisha and other researchers and 
grassroots activists show, we are faced with a paradox of knowledge: For the 
residents of Flint, who felt disregarded and disposable, the claims coming from 
representatives of the state were wrong and did not matter. And on the contrary, 
the state thought of the residents and grassroots mobilizers as not important 
enough to listen to their complaints about the water and its collateral effects. 
Eventually, the state did admit its mismanagement, but the citizens were not 
pleased with how long it took and claimed that acting sooner could have 
minimized the damage. 
 
In Western welfare states, the state is undoubtedly seen as an actor working in 
order to protect its citizens and their wellbeing. But what happens when the 
state fails to do so? I argue that the Flint water crisis is a prime example of state 
failure and a significant, unwanted change in the role of the state. The residents 
of Flint were used to believing in the state’s protective qualities and used to 
getting good water as living in a state known for its freshwater supplies and the 
Great Lakes. What ultimately lead to the complete erosion of trust towards the 
officials and democratic decision making, was the state’s changed role and its 
failure to live up to its expectations. The perceived conflict between what the 
state should be and how it should act (to protect its citizens) and how it in the 
end contributed to the crisis and its effects.  
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4.3 The undemocratic emergency management 
 
In this subchapter I delve into the debated emergency management law in 
Michigan, its meaning for Flint’s water crisis and the several problems 
associated with it. The most notable problem my informants emphasized is the 
law’s undemocratic nature. I also discuss the crisis from the point of 
infrastructure, a viewpoint that cannot be neglected in the case of Flint. 
Anthropological approaches to infrastructure demonstrate how infrastructures 
and their maintenance (or the lack of it) serves as a means of distributing 
democracy and how ruptures in infrastructures can reveal power dynamics not 
visible under normal conditions. The poor economic situation of Flint is 
manifested not only in the water pipes, but in the condition of the roads and the 
sewer service as well. It is important to remember that undrinkable water and 
water shortages are a massive worldwide problem, and therefore my thesis 
contributes to some extent to the discussion on the global water crisis as well.  
 
Several cities in the state of Michigan have a long history of economic and 
social struggles. Many of us might remember the badly indebted city of Detroit 
filing for bankruptcy in 2013, thus becoming the largest city in the U.S. to do so. 
In the case of Detroit, it was the local emergency manager who took such a 
drastic decision (Rushe 2013). Now, the city is in a considerably better 
condition: Its debt has been restructured, private investments are in an upward 
trend and the city’s central areas are growing attractive again thanks to various 
revitalization efforts. Not every city with an emergency manager has seen such 
improved outcomes, though, as the case of Flint demonstrates.  
 
Emergency management is a state-administered policy used to address issues 
of financial instability. The idea behind the emergency management is, put 
simply, to have an outside official who is not constrained by local politics, to 
make decisions in order to get the city back on solid ground. Emergency 
managers rely on austerity measures to achieve their objects: preserving the 
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financial interests of bond holders and finding privatization-focused solutions to 
problems. They rarely explore how different financial interests and instruments 
may have caused the economically distressed situation in the first place. David 
Fasenfest points out that the emergency manager laws in Michigan focus on 
finding a financial solution to a community’s struggles, rather than a social one 
(Fasenfest 2017, p. 36). It is widely believed that if the EM law had focused 
more on the welfare of the residents instead of cost-cutting measures, and had 
it involved the local community better, it could actually have served to prevent, 
or at least mitigate, the effects of the water crisis. 
 
In 2011 the former Governor of Michigan, Rick Snyder, signed the emergency 
management law, also known as Public Act 4 (PA 4). The law gave the state 
permission to appoint an emergency manager without having clear evidence of 
a city’s economic problems. The manager would not be responsible to anyone, 
but the governor and the law thus removed the governing powers from the 
elected local officials in cities. As Fasenfest puts it: “That is, a state takeover of 
a municipality, which suspends the decision-making authority of a local 
government’s elected leaders, could be initiated based on the sole discretion of 
the governor and other state officials” (Fasenfest 2017, p. 37). Also Clark notes 
it in her book about the water crisis: “Not only was the risk [of the water crisis] 
mortal, it was shaped from the start by the unusual political context of the city. 
Under emergency management, Flint didn’t have the power to make decisions 
for itself” (Clark 2018, p. 122). 
 
The rights of the managers were met with strong resistance from Michiganders. 
The people wanted to reinstate the old fiscal responsibility act law and therefore 
voted for a repeal of the law P4. However, the state responded by modifying the 
law and making it referendum-proof, that is, unrepealable (Clark 2018, p. 6). My 
informant Carroll was actually the first source from where I learned about the 
EM law. As we were talking, she let me know that she does not consider the law 
democratic at all and phrased her thoughts about the law this way: “It seems to 
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me that there should be a constitutional vote on that [laughs]. If our legislators 
are supposed to be acting on our behalf and that is not what we want… I’m 
incredulous. The emergency manager law absolutely is responsible for our 
crisis.” 
 
Flint was appointed an emergency manager in late 2011, after a review of the 
city’s finances. The first manager reduced the salaries and powers of local 
officials and city employees and eliminated over a hundred positions altogether 
(Clark 2018, p. 8). Finally, after several different managers and a devastating 
water crisis, Flint was turned over to an advisory board in April 2015. The 
Receivership Transition Advisory Board (RTAB) is an entity appointed by the 
governor, which continued to review the city’s financial decisions according to 
the EM law. In spring of 2018, the city took another step towards independence 
as the city’s elected council was given back its power, for the first time since 
2011 (Goodin-Smith 2018). 
 
Many people in Michigan have opposed the emergency manager law, calling it 
unconstitutional and racist, as most of the cities that have ever been under an 
emergency manager are majority-black cities. According to a lawsuit, in 2013, 
56 % of Michigan’s black population had lived under emergency management, 
compared to the 3 % white population (Gordan 2017). Robert, one of my 
informants, stressed this racial aspect of the emergency management law, as 
well as commented on it being undemocratic. He summarizes well the thoughts 
of the majority:  
 
Flint’s a poor black city and it was very easy to do that in a period of time 
when we had zero representation. Because when the emergency 
manager was here, and we had several of them, all your rights are gone 
as a community. There’s no democratic process left. Emergency 
manager makes every decision, and citizens have no course of action to 
say ‘No, we don’t want that to happen’. 
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He then continues with noting a fundamental aspect of the role of the state in 
the crisis, something that I have discussed throughout my thesis. Here I am 
quoting Robert again: “The real big thing is, when you’re poor, when you’re 
disinvested in, predominantly people of color community, it’s real easy to be 
written off. The state could not get out of here faster. And they tried like crazy to 
get out even sooner than they did, they’re still here to a certain extent.” All my 
informants seemed to be very aware of what was happening in their home city 
and the role of the emergency managers in it. I asked George about the EMs 
and he, fond of using metaphors, answered me like this:  
 
Bea: What do you think about the EMs and their part in this? 
 
George: Those are the reasons why this happened. If I put duct tape over 
your mouth and allow you to move but you can’t talk… Emergency 
manager takes away your vote, your voice, takes away your power and 
authority. You really can’t do anything even though you’re kickin’ and 
screaming. Whatever they do or say, it is what it is. That’s what the rule 
of law is gonna follow. 
 
Robert (like I believe many others in Flint) seemed to be sure that the water 
crisis was not an inevitable incident and could have been prevented. He said the 
following: 
 
You know, it was about money and power. And had not the emergency 
manager been there, had it been a local official, I don’t think they 
would’ve been so quick to have jumped to do something like that 
[changing the water source]. Because you know, I’m responsible to you, 
the people. The emergency manager was only responsible to the 
governor. Only person in the whole state that he was responsible to. It 
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was easy for them to do what they did, without concerns about how this 
is actually affecting people. 
 
As can be seen, the emergency management law was among my informants 
seen as unfair and robbing the democratic decision-making process from the 
city, thus making the people think that the officials are not to be trusted. The EM 
law and the managers’ decisions are a part of a larger state policy that focuses 
on cutting costs and narrowing the power of making decisions to a few people.  
 
When talking about the Flint crisis as a crisis of democracy and economic 
wellbeing, the discussion should not be constrained to water problems: there is 
a need to take into account all the other collateral problems related to water 
governance. The water system is an intrinsic part of city infrastructure, and as 
infrastructures play a significant role in producing or diminishing democracy, I 
thus want to discuss briefly the city’s infrastructure from an anthropological 
perspective. I argue that the governing of infrastructures, in this case letting 
them go unmaintained for such a long time, is one way for the state to create 
inequality and vulnerability. Appel, Anand and Gupta mention Flint in the 
introduction of their book The Promise of Infrastructure (2018): 
 
In Detroit and Flint, the centrality of municipal debt, the privatization of 
public goods and services, and the market-led governance might lead us 
to view both as typical examples of neoliberalism in practice. But in both 
cities, the water shutoffs were as much a result of longer struggles that 
date back to the 1930s as they were of more immediate pressures 
emanating from Wall Street. — — The state-sanctioned infrastructural 
abandonment that ensued over the following decades is coded today as 
the product of financially irresponsible residents on whom austerity and 
dispossession can justly be visited (p. 2). 
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Infrastructures and their material and political lives shed light on issues of 
technological progress, economic growth and equality between people, often 
revealing ruptures in relations between people and the institutions that govern 
people and infrastructures (Appel et. al. 2018, p. 3). In the case of Flint, the 
crumbling water pipes revealed above all the terrible condition of the city’s 
economic situation and the unequal relationships between the state entities and 
the poor locals. Some of my informants held a view of “water as an equalizer”, 
claiming that the same, lead-tainted water flowed into every home in Flint, 
regardless of the person’s income level and skin color. Others, however, 
strongly felt that certain city areas with lower income levels and a higher amount 
of people of color were more subjected to the effects of lead, than others.  
 
The water infrastructure in Flint was originally built to serve over 200 000 
residents, the population it had during its heyday in the 1960s. However, after 
deindustrialization and loss of population hit the city, only a part of the water 
network remained in use and the rest of the pipes were left untreated. It is also 
important to remember that besides residents, the broad network of water pipes 
was built to sustain the many automobile plants in the city. Now the 
infrastructure still needed to be kept up, even by a population that was shrinking 
and becoming poorer. Austerity regimes by the state of Michigan have further 
withdrawn public funds for building and maintaining infrastructure. Therefore, it 
was just a matter of time when something would happen to the pipes. Like 
Pulido accurately writes: “In this case, infrastructure is the manifestation of past 
wealth and capacity, and its eroding status, which is actively being produced in 
the present, signifies the politics of abandonment. Crumbling infrastructure is 
where past economic regimes meet the present” (Pulido 2016, p. 4). 
 
It might be hard for someone with not much knowledge about the water crisis to 
grasp how all of the things mentioned above relate to each other in the end. In 
my opinion Anna Clark summarizes it well in her book, illustrating the vicious 
circle that Flint was trapped in:  
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Flint’s infrastructure was in a death spiral. The water rates were 
expensive because the pipes were bad because vacancy rates were high 
because the city had been shrinking for so long. — — Then there were 
even fewer people to pay into the system, which meant that there was 
even less money to maintain it, which meant that [water] rates went up 
further. Repeat ad infinitum (Clark 2018, p. 36). 
It has been widely argued that the deterioration of the pipes is not just a Flint or 
Michigan thing, but a nation-wide problem. According to a study by CNN, over 5 
300 water systems, serving almost 18 million people in the U.S., violate the 
federal regulation for acceptable levels of lead and copper (The Lead and 
Copper Rule) (CNN 2014). Many of the locals seemed to be aware of this 
nation-wide phenomenon, like my informant Rebecca. She put it as follows 
when we talked about people’s interest towards Flint’s crisis slowly declining: 
“People do still care and worry about the city, but it also really elevated the need 
for cities all across the country and in the world to address similar issues they 
may have in their infrastructure.” 
 
Also, Shayne noted the larger problem of poor water quality and he assigns the 
blame on those who built the old lead pipes a long time ago: 
 
So yeah, this is a very unreal experience. Especially seeing other cities 
dealing with the same, if not worse water, but no one standing up for 
them. Chicago is bad, Louisiana, I’ve heard it’s really bad down there. I 
think what we’re seeing is… They’re calling it the great generation, the 
baby boomers, well, they messed up when they built infrastructure out of 
lead pipes. 
 
The neglecting of infrastructure is apparent not only in the water network, but in 
the condition of roads and sidewalks for pedestrians as well. A kind of national 
joke in Michigan are potholes, deep caves in the road caused by erosion. Like 
an Uber driver laughed when I concernedly asked about the condition of the 
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roads: “Oh, potholes? Well, those are just a Michigan thing!” He seemed to take 
it lightly, but I had already heard and read quite a few stories about potholes 
destroying cars and getting entire buses stuck in them. The fact that sidewalks 
only cover the immediate city center forced me to rely on Uber and occasional 
buses in the city. Also, Rebecca mentioned potholes and the fact that the road 
infrastructure is not the only one crumbling. She says that she believes that I 
had already noticed their terrible roads and how people always talk about that 
something needs to be done to them. Rebecca says Flint has an equally bad 
sewer and drinking water infrastructure but because it is underground and not 
visible, the residents do not really think about it until something like this 
happens. 
 
Appel et. al. argue that the governing of infrastructure is equal to governing the 
(unequal) politics of life in its entirety. To cite the authors more precisely:  
 
Infrastructures are a critical site through which politics is translated from a 
rationality to a practice, in all its social, material, and political complexity 
(Humphrey 2005). They are a material and aspirational terrain for 
negotiating the promises and ethics of political authority, and the making 
and unmaking of political subjects. Because  infrastructures distribute 
vital resources people need to live — energy, water,  information, food — 
they often become sites for active negotiations between state agencies 
and the populations they unevenly govern (Appel et. al., p. 21). 
 
In this chapter I have examined the relationships between the state of Michigan 
and the residents of the city of Flint. I propose that how the residents see the 
state is formed through everyday processes of the state and how the state 
officials treat the locals and their complaints about the water situation. The 
locals wanted to believe in a state that advances the interests and safety of its 
citizens, yet they lost trust in it and came to see the state as an undemocratic 
enemy trying to silence and marginalize an entire city. Not properly maintaining 
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the water infrastructure played a big role in the crisis, as the technical reason for 
the situation was the corrosive river water meeting the old lead pipes. Thus, the 
governance of the infrastructure was for decades just another way for the state 
to apply its cost-cutting politics. The financial politics and austerity measures of 
the state are what I focus on in the next chapter, where I bring forth a picture of 
a state applying private sector neoliberal policies to governing a city and thus 
producing poverty through strict austerity regimes. 
 
 
 
 The Flint River, photo: Bea Bergholm 
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5 The state of Michigan as a neoliberal actor  
 
In this chapter I wish to continue the analytical discussion on how my informants 
understand the actions of the state in contributing to the water crisis, now 
extending it to the austerity-based financial decisions the state has made 
throughout the years. I answer my second research question, “How did the city’s 
history of economic difficulties affect in the background of the water crisis’ 
emergence?” In the first subchapter I will look at some anthropological theories 
on neoliberalism and discuss them in relation to my own research findings about 
how the locals view the state’s business-approach to governing the city. In the 
second subchapter I extend my discussion to two phenomena closely linked 
with neoliberalism, namely, austerity policies and state debt. I trace back the 
history of cost-cutting measures in Michigan, in order to better understand the 
forces behind the initial water source switch. I also want to remind the reader 
that the previous chapter on state policies and this chapter on neoliberalism 
cannot be entirely separated from each other, as I have consciously pieced 
together both concepts throughout the thesis.  
 
5.1 On “running the state like a business”: Michigan’s neoliberal policies 
  
As stated before, this case in point is not a very straightforward example of 
neoliberal economics. The first thing that usually comes to mind when hearing 
the term neoliberalism, is privatization, the work of big multinational companies 
and the free market. In the case of Flint, however, there was no big, 
international corporation that polluted the city water without the interference of 
the state. Instead, in this case it was the state itself, acting according to a 
neoliberal policy, which places financial interests and cost-effectiveness above 
everything else. Also, I do want to highlight here that the preconditions for the 
water crisis had been there for decades as a part of the city’s history. The 
actions of the state officials were only what triggered the crisis and made it 
immediately felt and known. 
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I have already defined my use of the term neoliberalism in chapter 2 and here I 
am situating it more specifically in the context of Flint. The next quote from 
Ferguson aptly summarizes the kind of neoliberal state policies that were the 
root cause of the Flint water crisis: “Neoliberalism, in contrast, puts 
governmental mechanisms developed in the private sphere to work within the 
state itself, so that even core functions of the state are either subcontracted out 
to private providers, or run (as the saying has it) ‘like a business’”. He continues 
by arguing that neoliberalism deploys market-based techniques of the 
government and instead of blurring the boundaries between state and market, 
uses these market-focused procedures within the terrain of the state (Ferguson 
2009, p. 172). 
  
My informants echoed this kind of view about the state functioning as if it was a 
profit-focused company, cutting costs in order to increase profits. A similar 
viewpoint has also been brought forward in the media: For example, The 
Guardian wrote on January 23rd of 2016 about the crisis with the title “How Flint 
traded safe drinking water for cost-cutting plan that didn’t work” (Felton 2016). 
Depending on whom of my informants I asked, the blame for the situation 
seemed to fall on different parts of the state, as the state in this case is not seen 
as a coherent entity (see previous chapter). Michigan’s emergency manager law 
and the state-appointed managers in Flint did get a considerable part of the 
blame as the people in Flint accused them of running the state like a business. 
Like my informant Cameron put it: “I mean this is not the first time we had an 
emergency manager. They’re all about money, that’s the thing. In their eyes, our 
people, it’s a business to them.” 
  
George talks about the former governor of Michigan, Rick Snyder (in position 
2011-2019), who has been widely portrayed in the media as the biggest culprit 
for the water crisis. Here, too, what is apparent, is a critical attitude towards the 
state officials placing economic interests first: 
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He’s economically driven, which is great, we all need the money, we 
need a state that is very attractive to the rest of the world, but you can’t 
disconnect one from the other as leader of that level. You have to have a 
balance, have the interest of the people, have to understand that 
economics is important, understand the demographics which you’re 
serving, because as a leader you’re more of a servant than a dictator. 
Dictators are those that tail people and get what they want. But a leader 
serves their people and gets the results they’re looking for. 
 
A considerable amount of research on neoliberalism bears on the issue of the 
state in a neoliberal age and I have elaborated on this neoliberalism-state-
connection in chapter 2. The state is unquestionably an inseparable part of 
neoliberal policies, but is the state weakening or strengthening in the process? 
Earlier studies of neoliberalism emphasized the retreatment of the state from its 
role in regulating the markets, yet a more contemporary view is that instead of 
withdrawing, the state is intervening in market regulation in critically different 
ways than before (Kingfisher & Maskovsky 2008, p.117). So, on one hand the 
state can be seen to weaken and on the other hand getting stronger in some 
respects. Competition and maximization are fundamental principles of the 
neoliberal state and a strong state is the prerequisite for securing competition 
(Hilgers 2012, p.81). Here I am quoting Mathieu Hilgers on the role of the state: 
 
The state is thus both more present and visible, but at the same time 
more absent and weak, capable of coercion through informal measures 
(violence, threats, intimidation and firing recalcitrant civil servants or 
sending them to remote posts) but incapable of fulfilling its social 
obligations. In certain cases, we see a state that is expanding and even 
becoming stronger in some ways. Yet its weakness and porousness are 
revealed on a daily basis. The state thereby shows itself to be not an 
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apparatus, but a set of processes that are not always linked to institutions 
– or that, in any case, cannot be reduced to these (ibid., p. 85). 
  
The close relationship between the state and neoliberalism is the main reason 
that I am focusing on both theoretical aspects in this thesis. In the example of 
the Flint water crisis the state seems to be both stronger than before (as the 
operations of state officials were what ultimately caused the lead to leak into the 
water), yet also reducing its power and downright failing, as the main popular 
discourse of the water crisis implies: “Flint Water Crisis: How Michigan failed its 
people” declares a headline from the MLive news page on January 21st of 
2016. In addition, all of my informants strongly felt that the state had let them 
down and failed in fulfilling its task as protecting the citizens. 
  
As I have already made clear, the Flint case is not a textbook example of 
neoliberal policies, as the crisis lacks a company/privatization-focused aspect. 
Yet, a somewhat more typical aspect of neoliberalism becomes explicit when 
looking at the relationship between GM and the state during the water crisis. In 
the summer of 2014, workers at the GM engine plant in Flint noticed that their 
engine parts were rusting, and they associated it with the Flint River water. 
Soon after that, the company wanted to make a switch on their own, to make a 
contract with the suburb of Flint Township which was still on Detroit’s system. 
GM promised Flint that they would return to the city water and the new KWA 
pipeline as soon as it was completed. 
  
However, they needed the permission from the city first to make the switch and 
the emergency manager of the time accepted the company’s request easily, 
together with several other officials who were cooperative about GM’s demands. 
The same could not be said for complaints from the residents. The officials kept 
ensuring that the problems with the water plant could be fixed and that it would 
be too costly to switch back to the Detroit system, even though people were 
demanding it (Clark 2018, p. 63-64). Here we see how the neoliberal state 
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policies were working during the water crisis, in this case prioritizing business 
interests over human health. Dewaun summarizes his feelings about the GM’s 
water switch this way: “What they [GM] did was changed over and then used the 
[Detroit] water. You know, humans are using the [Flint] water, but the car parts, 
they using a different water source. So that can tell you a lot right there.” 
  
An incident quite similar to that in Flint happened in 2000 in Canada. The city of 
Walkerton, Ontario, faced an E.coli outbreak, which poisoned the city’s water, 
resulting in 7 deaths and over 2000 people being infected. Behind the outbreak 
were the city’s neoliberal governance forms as well as the practices of municipal 
officials who were mismanaging the city’s water supply. In the early 1990, the 
government of Ontario was facing deteriorating economic conditions, which 
forced it to adopt neoliberal fiscal reforms. Environmental spending suffered 
some of the deepest cuts and was restructured. This and several other factors 
contributed to the water contamination in the town (Prudham 2007).  
  
A parallel can also be drawn between the Flint case and Hurricane Katrina that 
devastated New Orleans in 2005. The root cause of the disaster was not the 
hurricane itself, but the deteriorating levees that were supposed to protect the 
area from flooding. The federal government had been under the influence of big 
private actors and therefore diverted funds towards other things than the levees 
(Ortner 2016, p. 54, see for example Adams 2012). The Flint water crisis is thus 
not a single, tragic case in point, but just one example of a myriad of similar 
cases of environmental and human rights injustices happening all over the world 
due to a belief in the superiority of neoliberal administration. 
  
A major part of the discussion on neoliberalism is focused on its negative effects 
(especially for the already marginalized populations), and my thesis is no 
exception to that discourse. Anthropologist Carol J. Greenhouse summarizes 
the reverse side of neoliberalism as follows: 
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— — Along with structural adjustment and soaring capital accumulation 
among the newly wealthy come permanent impoverishment and divided 
communities; privatization is accompanied by social fragmentation and 
democracy deficit; market values do not consistently sustain public 
services; outsourcing contributes to the destructuring of local economies 
and displacement of workers; liberty may take the form of abandonment; 
deregulation permits loss of accountability; unemployment and 
routinization of work allow the development of novel forms of alienation; 
the marketization of institutions creates improvised forms of 
empowerment and social reconstruction; national investments in global 
capitalism facilitate new regionalisms and— for citizens— new 
subalterities and risks of marginalization and insecurity (Greenhouse 
2010, p. 1). 
  
According to anthropologists Catherine Kingfisher and Jeff Maskovsky, there 
have been a few dominating paradigms in anthropological studies of 
neoliberalism. The first one, greatly influenced by Marx and Harvey, views 
neoliberalism as an attempt to restore capitalist class power (Kingfisher & 
Maskovsky 2008, p. 118-119). According to Harvey, the result of neoliberalism 
has been the growth of inequality on a national and global scale: A few 
individuals are amassing wealth, whereas poor people get even poorer and the 
middle class is struggling. A phenomenon he famously described as 
“accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 2005, p. 159). Similarly, Ortner argues 
that neoliberal policies are degrading the working class and the poor, and this 
attitude of derogation is manifested in the shrinkage of the state and the 
reduction of its social services. “Thus beyond deindustrialization we see a kind 
of more active war on the poor, again documented ethnographically in a number 
of sites and contexts” (Ortner 2016, p. 54). 
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This “active war on the poor” as an explanation came up several times as I 
asked the people I met about why they think the water crisis initially happened in 
Flint. The answers were downright depressing as they echoed feelings of 
marginalization, insecurity and worthlessness, aspects that are among the many 
negative consequences brought by neoliberalism, as described above by 
Greenhouse and Harvey. This is how Cameron answered my question, 
capturing what so many other people think as well: “It really don’t matter, cause 
ain’t nobody gonna care about Flint. — — We was already having a lot of crime 
and stuff, already in the poverty rate. What can hurt, basically here we already 
know the situation, I think they basically didn’t care.” 
  
George had similar thoughts about the socioeconomics (Flint being majority 
black, with high poverty and unemployment rates) playing a part in the 
background of the water crisis. He phrased himself as follows: “Anytime you 
have under-educated population, it’s a target. You’re going to get people that 
are going to be misused and used.” Some other informants expressed their 
feelings by referring to “those who matter and those who don’t” and noting that 
the officials were “not recognizing our value as persons or human beings”. 
Carroll says that the switch should never have happened in the first place but it 
happened because Flint was “a town on decline”. Shayne expressed probably 
the darkest vision of all, saying that “Everything that came out of Flint was 
forced to go bad.” Geographer Laura Pulido has researched the Flint case 
especially from the point of racial capitalism and this is how she summarizes the 
situation: “The local state, completely engulfed in the culture of neoliberalism 
and austerity, chose to respond to an urban fiscal crisis by poisoning its people. 
It felt it had the latitude to do so because its residents simply do not matter – 
they are disposable” (Pulido 2016, p. 8). 
  
I believe that the other one of Harvey’s central claims — neoliberalism as 
restoring power to the elites — is in this case supported by the feelings of all 
those who have first-hand experience of the huge gap between perspectives of 
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the Michigan governor and the people of Flint. George told me his views about 
Rick Snyder, saying that Snyder is a white, wealthy person who has had only 
privileges in his life and that there is no commonality in him towards anybody 
that voted for him. (“Except maybe for the five hundred people that have the 
same amount of money.”) According to George, it’s impossible for most of the 
people to relate to Snyder on any level, even those who claim to be able to do 
so. 
 
I asked Lenwood for his opinion on the governor. His thoughts seemed to be 
similar to those of George’s: “And his [Snyder’s] lack of awareness as to the 
decisions that were being made. You were voted in to not be the governor of 
just the best parts of Michigan, but you were called to be the governor of all of 
Michigan. You were not called to be the governor of the rich, but everyone.” 
Also Carroll agrees with the others, telling me that according to her, the 
governor has enjoyed too much luxury and does neither understand nor care 
what the people of Flint are living through. To her it seems almost like the 
governor is insulated from responsibility, which she finds saddening. During my 
fieldwork, it became very clear to me how much of a disliked figure Snyder was 
in the city. One evening I attended a film screening at the university of a 
documentary film called “Nor Any Drop to Drink: Flint’s Water Crisis”. There 
were approximately 60 people in the auditorium and when Snyder’s trial was 
shown on the film, the audience booed and laughed loudly and mockingly.  
 
Disliking and feeling alienated from the governor, believing the crisis was 
actively done to the poor people of Flint, and feeling like the local auto 
manufacturer was more worthy to the officials than the people were, all these 
stories from my informants demonstrate how the locals saw the state not just as 
an unjust force, but a neoliberal one that used private-sector policies in its own 
work. I argue that in addition to perceiving the state like a neoliberal actor, the 
long history of economic struggles in Flint should be considered when 
answering the “why?” of the water crisis. I have already throughout my thesis 
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explained the deindustrialization of Flint, and in the next subchapter I want to 
add some more details to it before drawing it all together.  
  
5.2 Austerity policies 
 
As has become clear by now, the ultimate reason for the lead poisoning was the 
emergency manager’s aim to cut costs and the rushed decision to switch to the 
Flint River while waiting for the Karegnondi pipeline to be finalized. But why did 
Genesee County need to construct a new pipeline basically duplicating the 
already existing one? There will probably never be a certain way of knowing 
how much the decision to build the KWA contributed to the water crisis 
happening, yet I want to briefly address it in this subchapter, as it relates to the 
city’s neoliberal policies and austerity measures.  
 
In 2012, when the KWA was just a plan on paper, it became clear that the 
project needed to get the city of Flint on board. There was a problem, though, 
the fact that Flint did not have the financial possibility to do that because of its 
debt. The CEO of the KWA and its leading proponent, Jeff Wright, argued for 
the pipeline as an economically-sound way to break free from the Detroit system 
and establish a more self-sufficient way of using the resources from the local 
river (Guyette 2017). In addition, it was seen as a way to aid economic 
development in the region as it could provide water to a variety of new 
businesses.  
 
Michigan’s Department of Treasury commissioned two different consulting firms 
to assess what would be the cheapest option for Flint’s water source, but the 
companies’ findings were conflicting. Followingly, the city of Detroit was asked 
to come with a new offer, but despite promises of reduced water prices, it was 
rejected by Flint’s emergency manager at the time. The appointed EMs were 
most likely in favor of the new KWA pipeline, even though it was not 
economically sound for Flint to participate in it. This is what Curt Guyette, a 
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reporter for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Michigan writes in 
Metro Times: 
 
Flint was broke. That's no secret. The city's dire financial situation is the 
reason the state came in and took control in 2011. The city of nearly 
100,000 people had a $13 million deficit and no credit rating. So, when 
the decision was made to join the Karegnondi project, the question 
became: Where will the city constrained by state-imposed debt limits and 
no interest from bond sellers come up with $85 million needed to pay for 
its share of the costs to build a pipeline from Lake Huron to Genesee 
County? (Guyette 2017) 
 
Carroll raises the same question as we speak about the causes leading up to 
the water crisis. She phrased her doubts about the KWA as follows: “So this is 
what did happen. I think we were less than 20 million dollars in debt when we 
got our emergency manager, or at least by the time they made the decision on 
the KWA pipeline. My question is, how was it that we were approximately 20 
million dollars in debt and it was saving us money to commit to a 120-million-
dollar pipeline?”  
 
The rest of Genesee County continued on the Detroit system as they could 
afford it, but Flint was unable to pay for its share while simultaneously building a 
new pipeline and making improvements (yet not all the essential ones) to the 
water plant (Guyette 2017). Eventually, the state arranged a work-around for 
Flint to make it possible for the city to commit to the pipeline even though it had 
hit the maximum debt allowed by law. The construction of the pipeline began in 
June 2013 and the 300-million-dollar project was estimated to cost Flint about 
85 million (Clark 2018, p. 162-163). The bewildering question is, why did the city 
commit to a new pipeline, yet refused to do the needed upgrades for the old 
water plant to function properly and safely? Carroll tells me that the water 
treatment plant was not back in 2014 nor is at the time of our talk, prepared to 
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process the corrosive river water and she criticizes the decision to disregard 
repairing the plant for money-saving reasons.  
 
To make matters worse, after switching the water source to the Flint River, the 
raw water should have been treated with corrosion control chemicals at the 
water plant. However, the staff at the plant had been told by the MDEQ that 
there was no need for corrosion control, not even though the plant had not been 
sufficiently upgraded (Clark 2018, p. 33). Rebecca’s comments on the matter 
are very similar to Carroll’s. She says the following: “Whoever made the 
decision to forgo adding the corrosion control to save money. And I don’t even 
know if that was the reason they did it! It was a negligible amount of money. 
Whoever did it, signed the death mark for so many people. That one boggles 
the mind.” 
 
Indeed, in the case of Flint, the decisions made in regards of the water 
distribution were very short-sighted and it would have cost the state significantly 
less to upgrade the plant and/or use corrosion control chemicals than to deal 
with the consequences of the lead poisoning and destruction of the water pipes. 
According to some estimates the corrosion control would have cost 
approximately 140 dollars a day (Lynch 2016), whereas fixing the infrastructure 
will cost, depending on the estimates, up to a staggering 1,5 billion dollars 
(Reuters 2016). And this is only the cost of the new water pipes, excluding all 
other costs such as water and filter distribution, health services and legal fees 
for lawsuits.7 
 
Disinvestment in environmental safety, running state operations like a business, 
cutting costs on all sectors and listening to and prioritizing companies’ demands 
rather than the undervalued residents’, are all aspects of neoliberal governance. 
                                                          
7 I want to stress that it is impossible to give reliable numbers of the estimated costs of the water 
crisis. Therefore, I have had to rely on several media sources in order to get a tentative picture 
of the costs, often categorized as social and material costs separately. 
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At this point of the thesis, I want to introduce another important concept relating 
to the water crisis, something that can be seen as serving as a backdrop for the 
state opting for neoliberal policies. Namely, the concept of austerity — a topic 
not very broadly studied in anthropology until very recently, at least according to 
my knowledge.  
 
“Austerity” is defined by the Oxford Dictionary as “ternness or severity of 
manner or attitude” or more suitably in this case as “difficult economic conditions 
created by government measures to reduce public expenditure”. Geographer 
and political economist Jamie Peck describes austerity in the 21st century as 
follows: “In the ‘entrepreneurial city’, municipal governments act as cost-saving 
business actors that run their cities like corporations” (Peck 2015, 1). Flint is an 
example of a city that has had to turn to austerity policies, which in turn resulted 
in less investment in the city and fewer services for the people.  
 
Austerity is a response to market conditions and it involves the state cutting 
finances from cities and often targeting the most vulnerable of populations. 
Government downsizing and increasing privatization are signs that austerity is a 
part of the neoliberal agenda (Peck 2015, 2). Peck emphasizes how this kind of 
development is prominent in the whole United States but especially in cities — 
therefore the term “austerity urbanism” he uses. Cities are relying on public 
services such as housing, transportation and various infrastructure. Cities are 
also the homes for suitable targets of the austerity programs: the 
disadvantaged, minorities and marginalized populations (ibid., 3). In the case of 
Flint it is clear that because of its long history of economic decline, 
abandonment of capital and the notable black population, the old Rust Belt City 
was a good candidate for such policies.  
 
“The pundits of austerity present it as morally neutral, as a remedy for fiscal 
malaise, to use medical terms. Despite the fact that the remedy is proven to be 
deleterious, it keeps on being prescribed”, writes anthropologist Theodoros 
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Rakopoulos (2018, p. 6). His definition of austerity is very similar to the ones 
mentioned above and in addition, he highlights the unequalizing effects of 
austerity measures. Austerity works as “a form of financialization of everyday 
life”, which aims to “change social formations and re-evaluate the worth of 
people’s lives” (Rakopoulos 2018, p. 2). 
 
The media coverage of the water crisis has repeatedly highlighted the 
discussion about Flint versus other, better-off communities with a larger white 
population. The juxtaposition between richer people and the disinvested people 
in Flint was also echoed during my fieldwork. As my informant Robert put it:  
I don’t think this would happen in a middle class, rich, white community. 
Because if the infrastructure failed, the denial won’t be there. That’s the 
big thing that happened here. Infrastructure failed, and everybody denied 
it had failed. If it failed in a white community, I don’t think there would be 
that big of a denial. It was easy to write us off. Because there were 
emergency managers sitting here, we couldn’t take care of ourselves, we 
ran ourselves into bankruptcy, all these things, ‘You’re bad people, you 
don’t know what you’re doing’. 
I see this kind of discourse and beliefs as an example of austerity measures “re-
evaluating the worth of people’s lives”, as Rakopoulos put it in his text, obviously 
re-evaluating them as less valuable than they used to be. I would say that every 
one of my encounters with people in Flint somehow reproduced this belief that 
the people are not worthy of the officials’ or state’s protection or promises. 
Dewaun called the whole situation “inhumane behavior” and said that the 
officials looked at Flint “as a throwaway”.  
As General Motors left Flint, the city faced the fourth largest population loss in 
the whole country within just ten years, from 2000 to 2010. For the first time 
since the 1920s, the city was home for less than a hundred thousand people. 
Normally, a state redistributes some of its sales tax profits to local governments 
to help the cities pay for their public services. In the case of Michigan, between 
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1998 and 2016, the state needed to fill gaps in its own budget instead and 
therefore Flint lost a significant amount of public money — an amount that could 
have eliminated the city’s deficit and paid off its debt (Clark 2018, p. 5). 
Anthropologist Laura Bear reminds us in her book “Navigating Austerity: 
Currents of Debt Along a South Asian River” (2015) that debt crises in the world 
are not a new phenomenon: In places like South and East Asia, Latin America 
and Africa, people have indeed lived through times of state debt and austerity 
already since the 1980s. Current policies focusing on cutting public spending 
should be seen as a part of a longer history of sovereign debt. According to her, 
these crises have been given surprisingly little attention in accounts of neoliberal 
policy: “Neoliberalism is often presented as a response to economic crisis, 
rather than as a redefinition of fiscal policy as primarily a financial question” 
(Bear 2015, 7). Bear writes that a few important aspects should be considered 
when examining debt crises: What types of practices of the public good are 
generated when the focus is on financial distress? And secondly, how are for 
example class relations, politics and environments affected by a financially 
focused policy? (Bear 2015, 7) 
 
Bear wants to create “greater precision in debates about historical changes in 
economy that are often labeled ‘neoliberal’”. She shares the current view in 
anthropology that neoliberalism is not a unified project, but rather techniques 
and institutional structures brought together. She argues that several of the 
changes in public policies termed as neoliberalism are linked to state debt and 
alterations in the mechanisms and relations of it. Therefore, a contradiction 
between the redistributive and extractive aspects of state institutions is created, 
which in turn leads to austerity policy, which Bear describes as “decentralized, 
creative, short-term and chaotic” (ibid., 7).  
 
My thesis could be said to follow Bear’s arguments, as I am writing about 
neoliberalism and austerity policies (adopted by the state of Michigan) as 
inextricably linked together, as parts of a longer historical process of 
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deindustrialization and abandonment of the city of Flint. In the case of Flint, 
there was no major economic crisis that triggered the decisions made about the 
water source as a money-saving measure. On the contrary, the state had been 
disinvesting in the city since the slow collapse of the automobile industry started 
in the 1970-80s. Therefore, my thesis brings together four major aspects in 
order to understand holistically the background forces in the water crisis: the 
state, austerity policies, neoliberalism and history. 
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6 Conclusions 
 
In this thesis I have examined the Flint water crisis from the perspective of the 
residents and how they experience the state of Michigan and its processes and 
policies affecting the crisis. I have focused on the twofold process of the state – 
citizen interaction: How the citizens see the state and its role and on the other 
hand, how they perceive themselves as defined by the state’s actions and 
processes. Throughout the thesis, I have provided several perspectives and 
answers to my research questions presented in the beginning. My questions 
“How do the residents of Flint perceive the state during the water crisis?” and 
“How did the city’s history of economic difficulties affect in the background of the 
water crisis’ emergence?” have been answered in several different chapters and 
here I want to draw it all together.  
 
So, “How do the residents of Flint perceive the state during the water crisis?” I 
construct my answer to this question in three parts. Firstly, the city residents 
perceive the state of Michigan as a separate force acting from the above and 
taking the control out of the hands of the citizens. As opposed to being on the 
side of the residents, my informants see the state as working against them and 
the Rust Belt City they are inhabiting. The city was subjected to a very 
undemocratic decision-making process regarding its water management: As the 
governor set the emergency manager law in action, the city committee lost its 
power and thus the entire city became voiceless.  
 
Even as the locals struggled to make their voices heard, showing up at protests 
and official meetings, they were systematically disregarded as the officials 
claimed that the water was fine. The people in Flint believe that the state 
justified its actions to itself by pleading to the fact that the residents are mostly 
economically disadvantaged and people of color, thus not worthy of protection 
and investments from the state. Through the interactions with the state, the 
locals also came to see themselves as placed under vulnerable conditions, in “a 
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city that didn’t matter”. As suggested by the several interviews and encounters 
cited in this thesis, the locals felt like they were disposable, of no value to the 
state officials, and not worthy of such protection as the state is supposed to 
provide to its citizens. However, I propose that despite of how the state treated 
them, the Flint residents stood up, took action and remained active agents in the 
precarious conditions they have been subjected to throughout decades. 
 
Secondly, in addition to being “above” the society, the state is perceived as 
dispersed, consisting of several actors on different levels. My informants 
recognized that the different parts played different roles in the crisis, as opposed 
to the state being a unified entity. This view is supported by an anthropological 
theory of the state, which argues that the state should not be seen as a 
coherent unit, but as consisting of parts with potentially different agendas 
(discussed in chapter 4). In the case of Flint, the different actors had 
contradicting views about the water management in the city. The federal EPA 
advised the MDEQ to use corrosion control chemicals for the water, yet the 
MDEQ refused. Additionally, some officials had warned about using the Flint 
River or the old water plant for treating the water, but their views were ignored in 
the decision-making. Seen this way, the conflicting views of the state were in the 
background of the formation of the crisis. I am once again quoting Gupta, 
arguing that the crisis was at least partly caused by “the friction between the 
levels that make up the state”. 
 
Finally, I propose that my informants see the state as a neoliberal actor that 
placed business-like governance and economic interests above human health 
and safety. In chapter 5 I discussed neoliberalism practiced by the state, a 
mentality developed for the private sector that is put to use in the public sphere 
as well. As my informants emphasized, the state was governing the city as if it 
was a business, thus first focusing on cutting costs and advancing monetary 
interests and only then considering the wellbeing of the residents.  
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The neoliberal governance is closely tied to the city’s history of decades of 
economic abandonment and austerity measures, which brings me to the answer 
to my second research question: “How did the city’s history of economic 
difficulties affect in the background of the water crisis’ emergence?” Ever since 
the late 20th century as GM left the city and its deindustrialization began, Flint 
was not seen as a place worth investing in. A city full of impoverished people 
and no jobs as the big industries had pulled out, Flint was not seen as attractive 
enough from a neoliberal viewpoint. And when it was not economically 
interesting for new companies and new people, the officials felt like they could 
disregard the city in their decisions.  
 
I propose that the big, economic transformations and the slow 
deindustrialization were at the root of the water crisis in 2014. As the city’s tax 
base was constantly declining and the state put money in its own pockets 
instead of trying to lift up the struggling city, Flint soon needed austerity 
measures in order not to go bankrupt like Detroit. Austerity policies and strict 
cuts meant that there was not enough money to keep up the crumbling 
infrastructure and invest in safe water management. I argue that the man-made 
Flint water disaster was the culmination of a historical process where several 
forces joined together, and the decisions of the emergency manager were 
actually just the tip of the iceberg. I propose that the long history of the city’s bad 
economic conditions in fact produced vulnerability, poverty, and the 
demographics the city now has, which in turn made the state turn its head away 
from a city that was no longer financially attractive. 
 
The close relationship between neoliberalism and the state is inescapable in the 
case of Flint. A question often posed in theoretical literature about neoliberalism 
concerns the role of the state and its strength as an actor. Traditionally seen, 
the state is weakening as it gives space to businesses and privatization. Yet in 
this case, I argue that the state, instead of strengthening or weakening per se, in 
fact became more like a business itself. This argument is supported by what my 
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informants said, as they referred to the state acting like a business and focusing 
on balancing the budget as opposed to serving its citizens. The locals saw the 
state as being unsuccessful in fulfilling its social obligations of protecting the 
citizens, thus it was seen as failing and weakening. On the other hand, the state 
also strengthened its grip of the city, assigning an emergency manager to 
govern and take all democratic decision making away from the locals. The state 
tried to keep up its role as a benevolent father meaning to help, yet it failed, 
silenced its children and made them lose trust in it. 
 
I believe the Flint case is a prime example of what happens when a city is left to 
its own and the abandonment by the state can and will change the residents’ 
understanding of themselves and the state that governs them, eventually 
leading to a complete erosion of trust. Despite having all my life lived in a very 
different place than what Flint is, I believe that what happened in Flint could 
happen again, basically anywhere in the world. Thus, the Flint case can open 
new perspectives to seeing what can happen if states and governments do not 
invest in shrinking cities and only focus on neoliberal cost-cutting. In this thesis I 
have looked at the water crisis from the local residents’ perspective. However, if 
I were to continue my research about the crisis, I would be intrigued to explore 
the other side of it: the state officials’ perspectives. What did they think? Did 
they feel like they had no other options but to change the water source? How 
have their lives changed since the spring of 2014? Those questions, however, 
will have to wait for another time. 
 
The early spring sun is about to set, and it is time for me to leave George’s 
house and let him get ready for his doctor’s appointment. We discuss the future 
of Flint and I ask him whether he thinks the people are still willing to fight for 
their rights. Even though I have seen the devastation of the city up close and felt 
it in my heart, George’s answer gives me a spark of hope. He says:  
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No, residents of Flint, regardless of how under- or uneducated or 
regardless of how old or regardless of how ignored we are, we’re not 
gonna stop fighting. Because we put that spark in this country to fight, 
you know. There will be no middle class, there will be no standard in 
living, there will be no corporate standards without the residents of Flint. 
Period.  
— — 
I’m proud of being a Flint resident, proud of being born here and to have 
that history. Just as I believe you’re probably proud of being Finnish. 
There are certain facts about this place that won’t ever change. We have 
a proud history. 
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